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ABSTRACT 
 Encryption is ubiquitous in the modern environment. While public/private key 
architecture has provided an amazing and powerful way to encrypt information so that 
only one intended recipient can decrypt, the computation required for this approach 
means that this encryption method can quickly grow extremely expensive. With that in 
mind, there are a variety of open-source stream ciphers that seek to provide relatively 
inexpensive stream ciphers to securely encrypt information. But these stream ciphers all 
operate using very different techniques to generate their keystream, as seen in the stark 
differences in paradigms between ciphers. As such, it is not immediately clear what 
operations are required to achieve the desired level of encryption. What cryptographic 
primitives are most common or efficacious in achieving security? Examining the Data 
Encryption Standard, Advanced Encryption Standard, and the stream cipher winners of 
the eStream II competition, an underlying trend composed of two operations emerges. 
Despite observing no clear n-grams defining precise cryptographic primitives, we 
identify a general structure common to all stream ciphers. Additionally, we identify that 
substitution boxes or multiplication operations are not necessary for stream ciphers, 
whereas addition and rotation operations seem to be essential. 
v 
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Those secrets might be good or bad; this thesis will not engage in the moral dimension of
this human phenomenon. In many cases in the modern world, however, people simply wish
to be able to share or withhold information: financial information, online transactions, or
simply personal matters one does not desire to share with the world. A variety of ways exist
to keep information private, especially in the information age. Encryption is a common way
to make a message, transaction, or other information private. To use the words from the
announcement of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in [1] in 2001: “Encryption
converts data to an unintelligible form called ciphertext; decrypting the ciphertext converts
the data back to its original form, called plaintext.”
There are two basic approaches to encryption: symmetric and asymmetric. Symmetric
encryption uses the same information for encryption as for decryption, hence its name.
Asymmetric encryption, however, uses different techniques to encrypt and decrypt, relying
on a fundamentally different set of operations. This paper will primarily focus on symmetric
ciphers. The two kinds of symmetric ciphers we discuss here are stream and block ciphers.
Block ciphers seek to take a “block” of information and encrypt it, ideally ensuring that no
one without access to the proper key can read it. Stream ciphers, on the other hand, seek to
produce a “stream” of encryption which is often used to encrypt a “flow” of data to prevent
others from being able to interpret the data (without the proper key). This thesis compares
and contrasts the foundational mathematical operations and sequences of a collection of
symmetric ciphers to search for common effective cryptographic primitives.
In addition to Data Encryption Standard (DES) and AES, the major symmetric ciphers
considered in this thesis are the winners of the European Network of Excellence in Cryptol-
ogy (ECRYPT) II Network of Excellence Competition. ECRYPT is a collection of organi-
zations funded largely by the European Union (EU) through the ECRYPT Coordination and
Support Action. The goal of ECRYPT is to support excellence in cryptology in academics,
industry, and government agencies. In addition to hosting ongoing opportunities related to
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improvement in these areas, ECRYPT also hosted two major conferences to provide open-
source advances in the field, usually referred to as ECRYPT I and II. Of the publications
from these conferences, there were seven steam ciphers selected as the “best of” ECRYPT
II’s eSTREAM competition in 2008. To date, none of these ciphers’ full algorithms have
been successfully attacked. As such, they provide examples of reliably secure ciphers for
our consideration of efficacious cryptographic primitives.
1.1 Motivation
Encryption of information is ubiquitous. If an employee has a wireless mouse, headset, or
cellular phone that connects to a vehicle via Bluetooth, then they have interacted with a
wireless encryptionmethod. If a student conducts online banking, purchases something from
a vendor’s website, or sends a digitally signed email, then they have first-hand experience
with digital authentication and encryption. For those in uniform, a servicemember who
has “filled” a radio to facilitate cipher-text transmission, programmed a Joint Capabilities
Release (JCR) for operation, or used a classified computer, that servicemember has relied
on the information security provided by encryption. All of these examples use the principles
of encryption through various implementations to assure data confidentiality. This thesis
seeks to examine the cryptographic primitives, or effective building blocks of encryption,
in some common ciphers to identify trends and commonalities across some of these kinds
of applications.
In large part, we rely on these systems because they are secure. But a balance has to be struck
between the strength of the security and the complexity of encryption. On the one hand, such
as in the online banking example, a single transfer requires small amounts of information to
be exchanged at a time, and so can afford intense computational efforts to ensure security
via asymmetric encryption. On the other hand, we consider two constraints that prevent the
use of the same high standard. One constraint is seen in the wireless encryption example
previously, where we see physical limits to the computation power available for encryption,
leading to the development of efficient hardware-oriented ciphers. Another example is when
there is a large amount of data that must be encrypted for transmission and quickly decrypted
to facilitate a continuous flow of information. Each of these scenarios leverages different
methods of symmetric encryption.
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This thesis will primarily focus on stream ciphers, which are divided into two different
categories to address these last two of the above examples: hardware-oriented and software-
oriented ciphers. These cipher paradigms rely on different assumptions, resulting in different
approaches to balancing the trade-offs between speed and security. In order to discuss the
ciphers in depth, the remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the concepts required
to discuss the ciphers. We first build up the mathematics, including integer representation,
modular arithmetic, and a brief explanation of algebra from groups to extension fields. After
the mathematics overview, we discuss some of the theoretical goals, common inputs, and
briefly introduce an unfamiliar reader to the concept of linearity and linear cryptanalysis
because of its importance in cryptological system design. We then close the chapter with a
quick summary of different cipher types, review the concept of a Substitution Box (S-Box)
and a cryptographic hash, and introduce the notation used in subsequent chapters.
We note, before we progress to our background material, that the field of cryptography is
necessarily open-ended. Advances in technology (such as quantum computing), new appli-
cations of mathematical concepts (as seen in the introduction of public key cryptography),
or years of scrutiny (as with DES) can reveal weaknesses in established ciphers or change
the way cryptographers think. Perhaps no cipher is truly secure, if only because of advances
in computing and brute force attacks. We choose to focus on established, well-studied, and
currently secure ciphers to helps us gain insight into secure trends.
1.2 Mathematics of Cryptography
To discuss the mechanics of cryptography, this section provides an overview and introduc-
tion to the mathematics required to discuss assorted ciphers. We begin with the integers
and their representation, move to modular arithmetic, and then discuss the foundational
concepts required from algebra to appreciate the operations involved in symmetric cipher
cryptography.
1.2.1 Integer Representation
In everyday usage, people use decimal notation to express values of integers. The word
“decimal” is itself an indication that the base unit for this expansion is ten. As an example,
the number 114 is used to denote 1 · 102 + 1 · 101 + 4 · 100. Decimal notation is common in
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many everyday circumstances, but in information theory or cryptography, base 2 and base
16 are often used to express values. Values expressed this way are often referred to as binary
and hexadecimal, respectively. See Table 1.1 for an example of equivalent expansions in
these three major bases.
Decimal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Binary 1 10 11 100 101 110 111 1000 1001
Hexadecimal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Decimal 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Binary 1010 1011 1100 1101 1110 1111 10000
Hexadecimal A B C D E F 10
Table 1.1. Integer Expansions
A note on notation: sometimes a number in hexadecimal can be written (10)16, but in this
thesis we will generally write 0x10. There are many reasons to express integers in this
fashion, but in this thesis we will often do so for consistency and to express information
in a more compact fashion. For a further discussion or efficient algorithms for converting
between integer bases, see Chapter 4 in [2] or [3].
1.2.2 Modular Arithmetic
In some circumstances, we are not concerned with all of the details in a given problem. An
example: what time will it be in 72 hours? Our answer is, of course: the same time as it is
now. In this case, we are not concerned with how many days pass, we are only concerned
with the time of day. This is an example of modular arithmetic, which is this section’s focus.
If we have two integers ?, @, and @ ≠ 0, we commonly say that ? divides @ if there exists
some number A such that @ = ?A . In this case, we say that ? and A are factors or divisors of
?, and conversely that @ is a multiple of ? and A. To denote the relationship between ? and
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@, we use the notation ? | @, read as “p divides q”. We note that if this is not true, we say ?
does not divide @, or ? - @.
The greatest common divisor of two integers ?, @ is the largest integer that divides them
both, often written gcd(?, @). If the greatest common divisor is 1, then the two integers are
co-prime. The least common multiple of integers ?, @ is the smallest possible number =
such that both ? | = and @ | =, and is denoted lcm(?, @).
Modular arithmetic rests squarely on the division algorithm, which states that for an integer
=, there are a unique combination of integers 3, @ and A, such that = = 3@ + A. Expressed
in words, we would say that an integer = can be represented by combining three unique
numbers 3, @, A by first taking the product of a divisor (3) and quotient (@), then adding the
remainder (A).
In modular arithmetic, we are only concerned with the remainder. From the example
where we are computing time, we are only concerned with the remainder after all the full
days have passed; we are thus operating modulo 24. In mathematical terms, we were saying
72 mod 24 = 0. Because we are only concerned with the remainder term in modular
arithmetic, we define the concept of congruence as: 0 ≡ 1 mod 2, if there exists an = such
that 0 = =2 + 1. Using the above example, we would say that 0 ≡ 72 mod 24.
We note that the idea of dividing an element by another, and only retaining the remainder,
is a concept that does not just apply to integers, but to polynomials as well. We will provide
additional examples of modular arithmetic in the following section. For more information
on the development and applications of modular arithmetic, see Chapter 3 in [4] or Chapter
4 in [2].
1.2.3 Algebra Introduction
To build up to an appreciation of the algebra involved in cryptography, we will begin with
an introduction to a subset of common sets, build from groups to rings to fields, discuss
the concept of irreducible polynomials, and then outline how to build extension fields. All
of these key concepts are discussed in [5]. This is all for the purpose of demonstrating the
mathematical underpinnings of the Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), which is a key
component in many ciphers.
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In our previous time example, there are a few ways we can consider expressing our situation.
On the one hand, the number of whole hours that pass can be represented as an element
C ∈ Z, but this is not commonly done. More often, we consider the hour of the day as an
element in the set {1, 2, . . . , 12} (or outside the United States represented from 0 to 24),
which can be represented with a bĳection of the elements from Z12 1. In general, a subset of
the integers that only includes from 0 to = − 1 is written Z=. The remainder of this section
will discuss special properties of these kinds of sets when we are using the operation of
addition.
Groups
A group, denoted 〈, ∗〉, is a set  that is closed under a binary operation, denoted by ∗,
which satisfies the following three axioms:
• 1: Identity. There is an identity element 4 in the group which does not change any
other element when used with ∗. Formally, we say ∃4 ∈  3 ∀0 ∈ , 0∗4 = 4∗0 = 0.
• 2: Invertible. Each element in  has an inverse element, which when input with ∗
returns the identity element from 1. Formally, ∀0 ∈ , ∃0−1 ∈  3 0 ∗ 0−1 = 4.
• 3: Associative. For any three elements in , we can group the elements together
without changing the output. ∀0, 1, 2 ∈ , 0 ∗ (1 ∗ 2) = (0 ∗ 1) ∗ 2.
We note the formal notation 〈, ∗〉 is often referred to simply as Group  in subsequent
references to save space, so long as the meaning should be clear. If the axiom 4 below is
included, we say that  is an Abelian group.
• 4: Commutative. The order of operations between any two elements of the group
produces the same output. Formally, ∀0, 1 ∈ , 0 ∗ 1 = 1 ∗ 0.
The “time of day” example we have been considering is useful: the hours of the day are a
group under the operation of addition. Mathematically, we describe this group as 〈Z12, +〉.
This time example is straightforward, but provides a simple explanation for a behavior that
applies equally well to any such 〈Z=, +〉, including when we consider binary or hexadecimal
expansions. For an example of how we compute binary addition, or 〈Z2, +〉, see Table 1.2.
1To transform the elements of the hours of the day to Z12, we need only add one to each of the elements





Table 1.2. Group Table for 〈Z2, +〉
While a table like Table 1.2 can be used to look up values in the group, more often one
simply computes the addition modulo =. In bit-wise binary addition as well as in our hours
of the day example, we can conduct modular arithmetic or look up the answer from the
group table. For more information on Group theory, see Part I in [5].
Rings
A ring, denoted 〈', +, ·〉, is a set ' that is closed under two binary operators +, · that
satisfy the following three axioms. We note that the traditional meanings for addition and
multiplication are associated with these binary operations:
• '1: 〈', +〉 is an abelian group.
• '2: Multiplication is associative. This is the same meaning as in 3 above.
• '3: Distributive Law. This ensures that multiplication “distributes across” addition
operations the way one normally sees when operating in R. This includes right- and
left-distribution. To be precise, we say that ∀0, 1, 2 ∈ ', 0 · (1 + 2) = (0 · 1) + (0 · 2),
as well as ∀0, 1, 2 ∈ ', (0 + 1) · 2 = (0 · 2) + (1 · 2).
• '4: Commutative. For the purposes of this thesis, we will only consider commutative
rings. This means that ∀0, 1 ∈ ', 0 · 1 = 1 · 0.
These four axioms hold in many of the mathematical circumstances in which we find
ourselves. For example, if we take operation over hexadecimal characters, one can easily
verify all the above for 〈Z16, +, ·〉. If we are operating in this ring, and only using one
hexadecimal “digit” when we add or multiply two hexadecimal values, we are actually
conducting addition and multiplication modulo 16. This can look odd at first, if for example
we say 0x9 + 0x9 = 0x2, because (in base 10) 9 + 9 = 18 mod 16 ≡ 2 mod 16. We note
that the algebraic concept of a Ring is not enough for our purposes in cryptography, because
there is a crucial gap: we cannot invert our “·” operation. So we must discuss additional
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algebraic structure to complete our mathematical underpinnings.
Fields
In order to define a field, we must first define three additional concepts. First, a ring with
unity is a ring as defined above that has a multiplicative identity. This is comparable to the
additive identity discussed in 1 above, but under our multiplication operation. Second,
each element in that ring that has a multiplicative inverse is called a unit. Finally, a division
ring is one in which every nonzero element of R is a unit. We collect these ideas into axiom
'5:
• '5: Multiplicative Inverse. ∀0 ∈ ', 0 · 0−1 = 0−1 · 0 = 1, where the multiplicative
identity is denoted by 1.
A set ' with binary operations addition and multiplication, denoted 〈', +, ·〉, which meets
the conditions '1 through '5, is called a field. We can also express a field succinctly as a
commutative division ring.
We note that many common sets are not fields. As an example, 〈Z, +, ·〉 is a commutative
ring, but not a field, because many elements do not have multiplicative inverses.
The application towards which we are building is the use of elements of a ring or field as
coefficients for a polynomial. In general, a polynomial 5 (G) with coefficients 0 ∈ 〈', +, ·〉,





8 = 00 + 01G + 02G2 + · · · + 0=G= + · · · .
As an example, Z[G] is a ring of polynomials using the variable G and coefficients from Z.
We note that this is a ring, not a field, because we cannot form multiplicative inverses of all
elements from the integers.
We are especially interested in finite fields. One way to construct a finite field is by starting
with the ring of integers and evaluating each element modulo a prime number ?. This maps
every element of Z to a coset corresponding to a number between 0 and ? − 1 (because
as discussed in Section 1.2.2, we retain only the remainder from the modulus operation).
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This generates the set Z?, which we incorporate with the binary operations of addition and
multiplication as 〈Z?, +, ·〉. This is often simplified to F?, and is also referred to as a Galois
Field of order ?, or GF(?). If we let ? = 5, we can see Tables 1.3 and 1.4 to verify all the
criteria for fields from above to verify that 〈Z5, +, ·〉 is a group.
+ 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 1 2 3 4
1 1 2 3 4 0
2 2 3 4 0 1
3 3 4 0 1 2
4 4 0 1 2 3
Table 1.3. Group Table for 〈Z5, +〉
· 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4
2 0 2 4 1 3
3 0 3 1 4 2
4 0 4 3 2 1
Table 1.4. Group Table for 〈Z5, ·〉
We note from Table 1.4 that each element in Z5 has an inverse, which addresses a key
problem when we were trying to build a ring with the integers. For additional exploration
of rings, field, or polynomials, see Parts IV and VI in [5].
Irreducible Polynomials
In order to introduce our final algebraic structure, we must first examine the concept of
irreducible polynomials over a field F. We recall that, when we are operating in R[G],
a reducible polynomial is one where we can think about “factoring” the polynomial. But
in this thesis we consider polynomials whose coefficients are from specific fields, which
means we cannot classify a given polynomial, 5 (G), as irreducible or reducible without
understanding the field from which its coefficients are drawn.
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As a very well-known example, we consider the polynomial 5 (G) = G2 + 1. If 5 (G) ∈ R[G],
then there are no roots, and so we can assess that 5 (G) is irreducible. If, however, 5 (G) ∈
C[G], then we know there are two distinct roots, and we can factor as 5 (G) = (G + 8) (G − 8).
This idea of an irreducible polynomial over a field is required to build extension fields.
Extension Fields
We can use the same technique used to generate the finite field Z? to create an extension
field. Simply put, an extension field is built by “dividing out” by an element from the
original set to build a new structure (consisting of cosets). In the case of dividing out by a
prime integer above, we used an infinite ring to build a finite field; we can also “divide out”
a polynomial ring by an irreducible polynomial to generate a field extension, with which
we have additional structure that we can leverage.
As an example, we consider Z2 [G], the ring of polynomials with binary coefficients. This is
an infinite set, but if we divide every element by an irreducible polynomial and retain the
remainder we are left with a finite field. We let ?(G) = G2 + G + 1, which is irreducible in
Z2 (we can verify by substituting in 0 and 1 to see that there are no roots in Z2). Below we
consider monomials from degree 0 to 5 in Z2 [G] to see how an infinite set is reduced to a
finite collection of cosets, using a reduced vector-style notation to indicate the coefficients
of the first 5 powers of G (up to G5):
• G0 mod (G2 + G + 1) ≡ 1
• G1 mod (G2 + G + 1) ≡ G
• G2 mod (G2 + G + 1) ≡ G + 1
• G3 mod (G2 + G + 1) ≡ 1
• G4 mod (G2 + G + 1) ≡ G
• G5 mod (G2 + G + 1) ≡ G + 1
For a few examples of how to conduct polynomial long division, see Appendix A.1. We note
that in the above we have mapped an infinite set into four cosets, and that for polynomials
other than those indicated, we can simply add the desired terms and see that we are still left
with only the elements of our finite field of size 4. As an example, if we take the sum of two
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terms from above, G3 and G5, we have
G5 + G3 mod ?(G) ≡ G + 1 + 1 mod ?(G) = G mod ?(G)
because our coefficients are in Z2.
What we have just done is build a field F4 by “dividing” the original set by the generator
polynomial ?(G). This is usually written in the form F4 = Z2 [G]/〈?(G)〉. If we consider U to
be a root of our polynomial ?(G), then our field F4 now contains this U, despite the original
set, Z2, not including a solution. Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the addition and multiplication
tables for this U. See A.2 for a walkthrough explanation of how these values were calculated.
+ 0 1 U 1 + U
0 0 1 U 1 + U
1 1 0 1 + U U
U U 1 + U 0 1
1 + U 1 + U U 1 0
Table 1.5. Group Table for 〈F4, +〉
· 0 1 U 1 + U
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 U 1 + U
U 0 U 1 + U 1
1 + U 0 1 + U 1 U
Table 1.6. Group Table for 〈F4, ·〉
Field extensions provide the algebraic underpinnings for how LFSRs operate. For additional
material treating extension fields, see Part VI in [5].
1.3 Principles of Encryption
There are a few basic principles of encryption that we consider to provide a framework for
subsequent comparisons of the effect of different mathematical operations. We begin with
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the basic concepts of confusion and diffusion, as proposed by Shannon in [6], then discuss
common inputs to a symmetric cipher, and conclude with a brief note on cryptanalysis.
1.3.1 Confusion
In many respects, this is the traditional concept of encryption. Take an input and change it
to make it unreadable, or “confuse” the output. Put a slightly different way, confusion takes
input and returns a different output. A mono-alphabetic cipher is the simplest example: map
every letter to another letter. This might work in very simple circumstances, but is not a
robust encryption standard.
A more robust application of the principle of confusion entails ensuring the relationship
between input and the output is very complicated. There are many ways to achieve this
effect. The step from a mono-alphabetic cipher to using a rotation of different substitution
alphabets would improve the confusion aspect, because we now require many different
“keys” to unlock the cipher. Another way to achieve confusion is to incorporate many
different inputs into a function that determines the output character, such as using input
from a secret key or Initial Value (IV) (as defined below in Section 1.3.3).
1.3.2 Diffusion
The principle of diffusion is somewhat more complicated. The basic principle is that one
change in one place of the input should effect several changes in the output. Put another
way: we want any changes in plaintext to “diffuse” through the ciphertext. This is also true
of the inverse, meaning if an attacker tries to change some of the ciphertext, the plaintext is
affected in several places.
This effect of the application of this principle makes the ciphertext more difficult to decrypt
without the proper information, because it means that more than a few characters must
be examined at one time in order to conduct cryptanalysis. This can be achieved through
many different forms, but a common way this is achieved is by conducting several rounds
of operations in encryption, and between each round by rotating the data or swapping the
bits in the data. To see a way this is conducted in DES, see Section 2.1.
For a further discussion on confusion or diffusion, see [6] or [4].
12
1.3.3 Common Inputs
Most modern symmetric ciphers have a few commonalities that we define here to provide a
baseline introduction to common inputs across all of the ciphers considered.
Key
This is a critical, unique value of a specified length, that is used by the cipher to encrypt the
message. The key must generally be kept secret by the user, and can generally only encrypt
a certain amount of information. In many situations, they key is the only part of a cipher
that is unknown to a would-be attacker, as the algorithms are often made public.
Initialization Value
The IV is another important component that can be required in a cipher, sometimes called
a nonce. It is worth noting that different ciphers may not use these, or even allow variable-
length inputs for the IV. In general, an IV can be thought of as either an extension to the
key or as the initial internal state of the cipher, and should also be kept secret.
Counters
Some ciphers use a counter, which is simply a number incremented by iteration, to augment
the IV or otherwise facilitate the encryption process. This need not necessarily be secret
per se, but depending on how it is used is generally part of the IV and is not be shared.
Plaintext
This is the original, easily read message. In most cases in this thesis, we will convert
whatever format the original message was into American Standard Code for Informa-
tion Interchange (ASCII), the backwards-compatible precursor to the increasingly-common
Unicode Transformation Format (UTF), to homogenize the message into bits or bytes.
We note that efficient transmission of information may also involve lossless, or in some
cases lossy, transmission of data; this thesis omits discussion of transmission to facilitate
simpler comprehension of the steps unique to cryptography, as compared to compression
or transmission. For a detailed discussion and development of codes, see [3]. Even with
this simplification, the information may look very different to human observers when in
different formats, so we must understand that they are simply different representations of
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the same information. We will consider the example message: “Try this!” to demonstrate
this conversion.
Table 1.7 provides examples of different expansions of our example message. Each row
represents a character in our message, with each column providing a different expansion.
We note that the ASCII column values are in decimal format.
Character ASCII Binary Hexadecimal
T 84 01010100 0x54
r 114 01110010 0x72
y 121 01111001 0x79
" " 32 00100000 0x20
t 116 01110100 0x74
h 104 01101000 0x68
i 105 01101001 0x69
s 115 01110011 0x73
! 33 00100001 0x21
Table 1.7. ASCII Expansions
1.3.4 Linearity and Cryptanalysis
While a full discussion of the cryptographic concept of linearity and linear cryptanalysis is
beyond the scope of this thesis, these ideas are important concepts that are connected to the
ideas of confusion and diffusion. As such, we will provide a very brief introduction to these
ideas to provide context for further discussion, using a similar structure as [7].
In mathematics generally, a linear function is often defined as a function 5 , with inputs
0, 1 for which the following is true:
5 (0 + 1) = 5 (0) + 5 (1).
For an algebraic discussion of general linearity, see Section 13 of [5]. We note that in
conversational English, the term “linear” is often confused with the more precise term
“affine.” We are concerned only with a specific application of linearity, rather than the
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general concept.
The term cryptanalysis refers to the study or practice of breaking cryptographic systems.
The idea of linear cryptanalysis was first proposed in [8] as a technique to attack DES, and
later explained more generally in [7]. The very basic idea is that a linear combination of
certain input bits can be used to generate the outputs. Thus a highly linear cipher is not
considered secure. To prevent this type of attack, cryptographers use nonlinear ciphers.
1.4 Cipher Types
With a basic understanding of the mechanics and inputs of ciphers, someone wishing to
encrypt their data must decide how they wish to do so. There are a variety of ways to
encrypt, as discussed in Section 1.1, and this thesis will briefly introduce asymmetric
ciphers before progressing to symmetric block and stream ciphers. This paper includes a
few block encryption schemes as a baseline for comparison, including the AES and the
DES, while primarily focusing our analysis on an array of stream ciphers.
1.4.1 Asymmetric Ciphers
A common example of an asymmetric cipher is seen in public-key encryption. The very
general analogy is that there are special kinds of locks one can use to secure information
with publicly available keys, which can only be opened by someone with a different kind of
key. We use a simple, standard example to illustrate.
We consider a few people who are sending encrypted emails: Alice, Bob, and Eve. Using
asymmetric encryption, if Alice wants to send a private email to Bob, she can use Bob’s
public key to encrypt so that only Bob’s private key can decrypt. If Eve intercepts this email
she cannot easily decrypt, because Bob’s public key is of no direct use in decrypting the
ciphertext. The idea of public and private keys provided a powerful new way to encrypt
information when it was proposed, and is still invaluable in many situations today.
However, the basic methods by which asymmetric encryption work rely upon more compu-
tationally intensive techniques than symmetric encryption and a different set of assumptions.
The underlyingmathematics are also distinct frommost symmetric techniques, often relying
on raising large prime numbers to large powers and reducing via another large prime number
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modulus. The solutions of these problems rely on elegant insights resulting in simplification
techniques developed by Fermat and other famousmathematicians. For a discussion of these
techniques, see [2] or [4].
Asymmetric encryption is ideally suited for some situations. But in other circumstances,
such as ones where a separate public and private key are not helpful, hardware constrained
environments, or transmitting a large quantity of data, a symmetric cipher may be more
efficient. As such, the remainder of this thesis focuses on symmetric techniques and ciphers
due to their efficiency and effectiveness in encrypting arbitrarily large volumes of data.
1.4.2 Block Ciphers
In the traditional execution of a block cipher, or Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode, the
algorithm divides up the message into blocks of a certain length, then performs a defined
sequence of operations on each block, returning a cipher text. This is an invertible process,
and decryption involves breaking the ciphertext back into those same blocks and then
performing the inverse operations on the data to return the plaintext message. There are other
modes of block cipher operation, such as Counter (Mode of Block Cipher Operation) (CTR)
or Output Feedback (OFB), that do not operate precisely in this fashion. For simplicity we
focus exclusively on the ECB.
Table 1.8 shows the input and output steps using AES to encrypt our sample message.
Every row in the table is a single character, and the columns progress from plaintext, to
ASCII value for the character (expressed in hexadecimal), the ASCII value output from the
cipher in place of that character (also hexadecimal), and the corresponding character for
the ciphertext. In this case, our original plaintext of “Try this!” has the resulting ciphertext
“,ê(0x08)í{å?(0x91)q” for the same message 2. See Appendix A.6 for notes on the code
used to generate this example.
2The non-renderable characters are often instructions used in early computers that are no longer necessary.
In this case the codes refer to the commands “backspace” and “undefined.” To ensure backwards compatibility,
these ASCII and UTF values are retained but seldom used.
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Character ASCII Cipher ASCII Cipher Character
T 0x54 0x2c ,
r 0x72 0xea ê
y 0x79 0x08 0x08 (“backspace”)
" " 0x20 0xed í
t 0x74 0x7b {
h 0x68 0xe5 å
i 0x69 0x3f ?
s 0x73 0x91 0x91 (“undefined”)
! 0x21 0x71 q
Table 1.8. Block Cipher Example.
1.4.3 Stream Ciphers
Stream ciphers, on the other hand, function like a Pseudo-Random Number Generator
(PRNG) and generate keystream (sometimes compared to “noise”) which is added bit- or
byte-wise to the message. This encryption process is very different from block ciphers,
where the cipher operates in a complicated fashion on the plaintext to produce ciphertext;
the stream cipher creates keystream that is added to the plaintext to encrypt via bit- or
byte-wise Exclusive OR logical operator (XOR). This means that decryption consists of
simply adding that same keystream stream back to return the original message.
Table 1.9 demonstrates the steps for a stream cipher. Again, each row is a single character
in our message. This time, the columns are the binary expansion, the binary keystream
output, and the ciphertext binary expansion. We note that for Salsa20, the cipher stream is
the bytewise addition of the binary with the keystream. Here, our test message returns “
xÂ(0xad)èÅ(0x1c)£*) ” as our ciphertext.
For an in-depth discussion of Boolean functions and stream ciphers, see chapter 7 in [9].
1.5 Substitution Boxes
The S-Box is a common tool to confuse outputs, and is used in many ciphers. The basic
idea is to take and input and return (or substitute) a different output, e.g., a mono-alphabetic
cipher, where each letter is exchanged for another letter. We note that in general, the outputs
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Character Binary Keystream Binary Cipher Binary Cipher Character
T 01010100 00100100 01111000 x
r 01110010 01010000 11000010 Â
y 01111001 00110100 10101101 0xad (“soft hyphen”)
" " 00100000 11001000 11101000 è
t 01110100 01010001 11000101 Å
h 01101000 10110011 00011100 0x1c (“file separator”)
i 01101001 00111010 10100011 £
s 01110011 00110110 00101010 *
! 00100001 00001000 00101001 )
Table 1.9. Stream Cipher Example.
and inputs do not have to be of the same size.
Figure 1.1 shows the AES encryption S-Box. In this case, the two-digit input is transformed
into a two-digit output. As an example, if input < =0xf2, output 2=0x89.
Figure 1.1. AES S-Box. Source: [1]
This is not the only way to configure a S-Box. Another way, as used by DES, takes a 6-bit
input and returns a 4-bit output. The first and last bit determine the row accessed, while the
inner bits determine the column accessed. Figure 1.2 depicts one of the tables in DES. In
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this example, if the input < = 101010, the row accessed is 10 in binary, or the third row,
and the column accessed is 0101, or the fifth row, to return 2 = 6 or 2 = 0110 in binary.
Figure 1.2. DES S-Box (1. Source: [10]
We note that the inputs and outputs from a given S-Box need not have the same size, but
that the process must be invertible to ensure decryption is possible. For more discussion on
S-Boxes or the development of the ones in Figures 1.1 and 1.2, see [4].
1.6 Hashes
In some of the documentation for the ciphers discussed in Chapter 2, there are references to
hash functions. While direct discussion of hashes is not the express aim of this thesis, their
importance in message verification and the use of similar processes merit a brief outline.
The following introduction parallels the introduction from [4].
An implicit requirement of encryption is that the ciphertext can be converted back to
plaintext, and so anymathematical encryption is said to be invertible because we can “undo”
any operations in the encryption process. Hashes work differently; they take a message and
turn that message into a string of a fixed length via one-way processes. This is sometimes
referred to as amessage digest, because the plaintext can be arbitrarily long, but the output
is set based on the specific hash algorithm.
In general, as outlined in [4], hashes should satisfy three properties:
• 1: Fast. Calculating the hash of a message<1, annotated ℎ(<1), should be relatively
fast.
• 2: One-Way. If we have a hash of a message , it is not computationally feasible to
simply search for some message < such that ℎ(<) = .
• 3: Collision-Free. It is computationally infeasible to find a message <2 such that
ℎ(<1) = ℎ(<2) (can sometimes be relaxed). This means that it is difficult to find a
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message whose hash “collides,” or has the same hash, as the original message.
These three basic ideas contribute to the utility of hash functions as a way to verify message
integrity. If the hash of a message is included at the end of the message, then the receiver
simply computes the hash themselves and compares their computed hash with the sent
message hash. By 1, it is cheap for the message receiver to compute the hash, and by 2
and 3 the message recipient can be confident that their message was not altered.
For more information on hashes, see [4].
1.7 Operations
As the final section of the introduction, we introduce the broad types of operations used
in ciphers, and briefly introduce their notation. The following list of operations provides
the categories of operations used in subsequent chapters. We note these operations are
distinct from those mentioned in Chapter 4 of [11] (which include bitwise permutations,
bitwiseBoolean operations, S-Boxes, andmodular arithmetic) becausewe are not examining
hardware implementations, but rather searching for patterns in discrete, mathematically
distinct operations.
1. Addition: In many settings in this thesis, we mean bit- or byte-wise addition, which is
additionmodulo 2 or 28 respectively, but there are other possiblemoduli. Themeaning
of the “+” should be clear in the context it is used. This category also includes the
XOR operation. In general, the mathematical operation of addition (here usually with
a modulus) changes a single input into a different single output, thus directly assisting
in confusing the output. Depending on how a collection of operations are structured,
different inputs may be combined into one output, which can also assist in diffusing
any changes.
2. Substitution Box: For an S-Box  with input G, we write  [G], which returns some
output ~which is often (but not necessarily) of the same size. The use of this operation
can directly achieve confusion or reduce linearity (if the relationships between inputs
and outputs are constructed properly), but depending on how the S-Box is constructed
may also contribute to diffusion.
3. Multiplication: As with addition, we generally are referring to multiplication with a
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modulus that should be made clear. This is often annotated similar to high-school
algebra (two terms immediately adjacent), as an exponent, or with a ·. This category
also includes the logical AND operation. This operation generally contributes to the
confusion principle, but can also disrupt linearity bymasking or otherwise nonlinearly
modifying the outputs (as seen in a Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NFSR)).
4. Rotation: This operation is applied in many fashions. If we are looking at blocks of
text, to “rotate” them G spaces means to shift each character G spaces in a direction,
wrapping around to the other side when necessary. This is commonly annotated
with <<< for a left rotation, and >>> for a right rotation. We consider the effects
of the “shift” operation to be within this category as well, even as we note that
we lose the information from characters shifted out of the string and replace the
empty characters with a 0 (unless otherwise specified). The shift is annotated <<
for left-shift, >> for right-shift. We note two other mathematical perspectives on
rotations: first, that if we are considering a polynomial ?(G) ∈ F[G], this operation is
analogous to multiplication by a nonconstant polynomial; second, this operation is a
subset of permutation operation (included in the next category) where the ordering of
characters is retained. Despite these two observations, we categorize this operation
as distinct because of its demonstrated utility in encryption. This operation is the
classical operation to achieve the principle of diffusion, but can also contribute to
nonlinearity and confusion.
5. Other Operations: For comparison of total operations, we also include a few other
types of operations, including permutation of values, comparing size of values (e.g.,
equivalence, larger, or smaller), “slicing” or concatenating strings, and copying a value
several times. These operations, while not necessarily mathematically modifying the
data, can all contribute to confusion, diffusion, and a reduction of linearity.
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This chapter aims to provide an overview and description of the major cryptographic
algorithms considered in this thesis. To provide a context for comparison of mathematical
computations and operations, we will first consider DES and then AES operating in ECB
mode (the traditional mode for introducing these ciphers). While these are block ciphers,
and so do not provide a perfect comparison with stream ciphers, they are the first and
current (respectively) major ciphers formally adopted by the National Institute of Standard
and Technology (NIST) to encrypt data. Following these initial ciphers, we will discuss the
winners of the ECRYPT II eSTREAM competition, which culminated in 2008. We again
note that these are considered reliable ciphers, meaning they have been closely studied and
there have been no successful cryptanalysis against their full implementations.
For those familiar with ciphers, we again note that DES andAES can operate in other modes,
such as Cipher Block Chaining (CBC), Cipher Feedback (CFB), OFB, or CTRmode. While
these modes, specifically CFB or CTR mode, function more similarly to stream ciphers, we
will focus on the basic ECB mode for the sake of simplicity.
For each of the ciphers, we provide an overview of inputs and then three subsections:
functions, initialization steps required, and encryption stream generation.
2.1 DES
This block cipher was proposed by International Business Machines (Corporation) (IBM)
in response to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) (predecessor to the NIST) for a
national cryptographic standard. After a review and some adjustments by the National
Security Agency (NSA), DES was published as the official data encryption standard with
a free license for its use, as discussed in [10]. It remained the primary standard despite
mounting evidence of weaknesses until 2000, when it was formally replaced by AES in [1].
DES is a block cipher that uses a 64-bit key (which includes eight parity bits) to encrypt
64-bit blocks of plaintext through an initial permutation and 16 rounds of a function to
achieve encryption. In addition to the original publication in [10], [4] also provides an
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in-depth discussion of DES.
2.1.1 Functions
Only one major function is used in DES, per [10]: the function 5 used in each round. The
inputs to this function are the second 32 bits, or the right half, of the previous intermediate
ciphertext, denoted in encryption as '8−1. This function consists of four steps.
1. ' is expanded from 32 bits to 48 bits via an expansion permutation, denoted  (').
2.  (') ⊕  8 is computed and sliced up into 8 strings of 6 bits, labelled 12 . . . 8.
3. Each 8 above is input into a separate S-Box to return a 4-bit output, represented as
12 . . . 8. See Figure 1.2 in the previous section for an example of (1. We note
these are unique to each position 8 in 8, but the 8th box remains the same through all
the rounds.
4. The string 12 . . . 8 is permuted to produce a final 32-bit string and returned.
2.1.2 Initialization
As described in [10], there is no initialization per se for this algorithm save the creation of
the round keys  8 from  . We recall that  was a 64-bit key, of which eight bits were parity
bits. The round key  8 is built through three major steps:
1. Parity bits are discarded and the remaining bits are permuted. The resulting string
from this permutation is written as 00, where 0 and 0 each have 28 bits.
2. For each round 8 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 16}, we let 8 = !(8 (8−1) and 8 = !(8 (8−1), where
!(8 is a left-shift of on digit for the first, second, ninth, and sixteenth rounds, and two
digits for all others.
3. Only 48 bits of the 56-bit string 88 are chosen according to a set list of numbers.
Those 48 bits are assigned as  8.
2.1.3 Encryption
We note we are considering ECB mode of operation for this cipher, as published in [10].
There are three main stages to encrypting each block of 64 bits:
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Figure 2.1. DES Feistel System. Source: [10].
• Initial permutation. The plaintext < is permuted by a fixed initial permutation, and
then divided into a left- and right-half: < = !0'0.
• 16 Rounds of Feistel System. See Figure 2.1 for an illustration of the first few rounds.
For each round 8 in 8 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 16}, we perform the following:
!8 = '8−1,
'8 = !8−1 ⊕ 5 ('8−1,  8).
• Final permutation. The final left and right halves are switched and an inverse permuta-
tion is performed to return the ciphertext. This is usually depicted 2 = %−1('16!16).
2.2 AES
In 1997, the NIST formally issued a call for block cipher submissions to replace DES.
After several rounds winnowing the submissions, the Rĳndael cipher (pronounced like
“Rain Doll,” formed by combining the names of the authors J. Daemen and V. Rĳman) was
selected as the Advanced Encryption Standard. The cipher can take 128-, 192-, or 256-bit
keys, and operates on blocks of 128 bits to conduct 10 rounds of operations (each of which
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is considered a Substitution Permutation Network (SPN)) to encrypt the plaintext. See the
original publication document in [1] or [4] for additional details on the cipher or its history.
2.2.1 Functions
There are two major functions used in the AES encryption process as originally published
in [1]: a shift-row function (() and a mix-column function ("). See Figure 1.1 for the AES
S-Box.
1. Shift-Row (. This function takes 16 bytes as inputs () and returns 16 bytes as outputs
(). If we divide the input  and output  into four-byte sequences, arranged into a matrix
of four rows (with four columns), we return  by performing the following operations on
the rows of the matrix:
1 = 1 <<< 0
2 = 2 <<< 1
3 = 3 <<< 2
4 = 4 <<< 3.
As an example, if 2 = (11, 12, 13, 14), then 2 = (12, 13, 14, 11).
2. Mix-Column " . This function also takes 16 bytes as inputs () to return 16 bytes as
outputs (), denoted  = " (). This function again organizes the bytes into a 4×4 matrix
(where the first four bytes are the first row, the second four bytes are the second row, and so
forth), and multiplies the matrix by another 4×4 matrix of constants to return a final 4×4
matrix of 16 bytes  (where we again extract the first row as the first four bytes of  and so
forth). We note that throughout this operation, we consider each byte an element of GF(28).
As an example of the first byte in , denoted 38, 9 for the 8th row and the 9 th column of
output:
31,1 = 2 · 21,1 + 3 · 22,1 + 1 · 23,1 + 1 · 24,1.
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2.2.2 Initialization
The only initialization required for this cipher is the development of the key schedule from the
original key, as prescribed in [1].We take as an example the 128-bit key, organized into a 4×4
matrix of bytes. The first four columns of this matrix are labeled, (0),, (1),, (2),, (3),
with the new columns generated recursively.
For column 8 where 8 is a multiple of 4, we first define a special transformation ) (, (8−1)):
• If, (8 − 1) = the four-byte sequence 0, 1, 2, 3, then we let 4, 5 , , ℎ = ([1, 2, 3, 0].
• Compute a round constant, where A (8) = 00000010(8−4)/4 in GF(28).
• We then let ) (, (8 − 1)) be the column vector (4 ⊕ A (8), 5 , , ℎ)) .
For column 8 where 8 is not a multiple of 4, we set:
, (8) = , (8 − 4) ⊕, (8 − 1).
This generates the key schedule so that round key  8 for the 8th round consists of the 4×4
matrix built from the columns, (48),, (48 + 1),, (48 + 2),, (48 + 3).
2.2.3 Encryption
We note that we are considering the ECB mode of operation from [1]. Encryption for AES
consists of one pre-round step and ten rounds of encryption. We first organize the plaintext
into a 4×4 matrix of bytes (where the first four bytes of plaintext go in the first row, etc).
Add to this the matrix  0, returning the 4×4 matrix we call 0.
For rounds 8 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 10}, we perform the following steps:
8 =  [8−1] (Byte-wise input into S-Box returned via matrix)
8 = ((8)
8 = " (8) (This step omitted for round 10)
8 = 8 +  8 .
The final output is 10 as the 128-bit ciphertext.
27
2.3 HC128
This stream cipher was proposed by Hongjun Wu in [12]. The broad idea is to take a
128-bit key and 128-bit IV to build two 512-register S-Boxes, and use those with the IV to
simultaneously update the S-Boxes and create keystream.
2.3.1 Functions
There are six major functions present in this cipher and defined in [12]. We note that in this
context, ’+’ means addition modulo 1032. For ℎ1, ℎ2, %[G0] (or & [G0]) refers to the 32-bit
output of the % (or &) S-Box, based on the input byte G0 where G is a 32-bit word such that
G = G3 | |G2 | |G1 | |G0,
51(G) = (G >>> 7) ⊕ (G >>> 18) ⊕ (G >> 3)
52(G) = (G >>> 17) ⊕ (G >>> 19) ⊕ (G >> 10)
1(G, ~, I) = ((G >>> 10) ⊕ (I >>> 23)) + (~ >>> 8)
2(G, ~, I) = ((G <<< 10) ⊕ (I <<< 23)) + (~ <<< 8)
ℎ1(G) = & [G0] +& [256 + G2]
ℎ2(G) = %[G0] + %[256 + G2] .
2.3.2 Initialization
Per [12], there are three major steps to the initialization.
1. The Key and IV are broken into bytes ( =  0 | | 1 | | 2 | | 3, IV split similarly), then
expanded to fill a 1280-byte array, using the key, IV, and a linear combination of 51, 52,




 8 0 ≤ 8 ≤ 7
+8−8 8 ≤ 8 ≤ 15
52(,8−2) +,8−7 + 51(,8−15) +,8−16 + 8 16 ≤ 8 ≤ 1279.
2. Load the initial values of, into the S-Boxes %,& as follows:
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%[8] = ,8+256 for 0 ≤ 8 ≤ 511
%[8] = ,8+768 for 0 ≤ 8 ≤ 511.
3. Run the cipher 1024 times, feeding the “cipher” output back into the table elements per
the below steps. We note in this context that “-” means subtraction modulo 512, and we let
each iteration be counted as 8 mod 512 as we execute 1024 steps. For the first 512 steps:
%[8] = (%[8] + 1(%[8 − 3], %[8 − 10], %[8 − 511])) ⊕ ℎ1(%[8 − 12]).
The second 512 steps are:
& [8] = (& [8] + 2(& [8 − 3], & [8 − 10], & [8 − 511])) ⊕ ℎ2(& [8 − 12]).
2.3.3 Encryption
As outlined in [12], for each iteration of the algorithm we generate a 32-bit output of
keystream and update one entry of one S-Box, alternating between the S-Boxes every 512
steps. In the below description, “-” still means subtraction modulo 512, and B8 indicates the
output keystream byte of step 8.We generate each byte of keystream needed per the below
pseudo-code:
8 = 0
9 = 8 mod 512
if (8 mod 1024) < 512 then
%[ 9] = %[ 9] + 1(%[ 9 − 3], %[ 9 − 10], %[ 9 − 511])
B8 = ℎ1(%[ 9 − 12]) ⊕ %[ 9]
else
& [ 9] = & [ 9] + 2(& [ 9 − 3], & [ 9 − 10], & [ 9 − 511])
B8 = ℎ2(& [ 9 − 12]) ⊕ & [ 9]
end if
The keystream output B8 (one byte) is then simply added on top of the message to encrypt.
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2.4 Rabbit
The stream cipher Rabbit was proposed byM. Boesgaard, M. Vesterager, and T. Christensen
in [13]. The cipher uses a 128-bit key and optional 64-bit IV to build an internal state register
of 513 bits, organized into eight internal state variables, eight counters, and a carry bit. The
cipher then produces keystream based on the state of the register, concurrently updating the
variables, counters, and state bit.
2.4.1 Functions
There are only two functions defined for this cipher in [13], called the “next-state function”
and the “counter update,” each of which consists of nine equations to update each of the
state variables or counters. One system iteration, or step, consists of running each function
once. We note that state variables and counters at position 9 and at step 8 are represented as
G 9 ,8 and 2 9 ,8, respectively, and that in this context ’+’ means addition modulo 232.
The nine pieces of the next-state function are as follows:
 9 ,8 = ((G 9 ,8 + 2 9 ,8+1)2 ⊕ ((G 9 ,8 + 2 9 ,8+1)2 >> 32)) mod 232
G0,8+1 = 0,8 + (7,8 <<< 16) + (6,8 <<< 16)
G1,8+1 = 1,8 + (0,8 <<< 16) + 7,8
G2,8+1 = 2,8 + (1,8 <<< 16) + (0,8 <<< 16)
G3,8+1 = 3,8 + (2,8 <<< 16) + 1,8
G4,8+1 = 4,8 + (3,8 <<< 16) + (2,8 <<< 16)
G5,8+1 = 5,8 + (4,8 <<< 16) + 3,8
G6,8+1 = 6,8 + (5,8 <<< 16) + (4,8 <<< 16)
G7,8+1 = 7,8 + (6,8 <<< 16) + 5,8 .
The nine equations in the counter update function are below. We note that the 0= terms
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below correspond to hexadecimal constants, and the q term is referred to as the “carry bit”:
q 9 ,8+1 =

1 if 20,8 + 00 + q7,8 ≥ 232 ∧ 9 = 0
1 if 2 9 ,8 + 0 9 + q 9−1,8+1 ≥ 232 ∧ 9 > 0
0 otherwise
20,8+1 = 20,8 + 00 + q7,8 mod 232
21,8+1 = 21,8 + 01 + q0,8+1 mod 232
22,8+1 = 22,8 + 02 + q1,8+1 mod 232
23,8+1 = 23,8 + 03 + q2,8+1 mod 232
24,8+1 = 24,8 + 04 + q3,8+1 mod 232
25,8+1 = 25,8 + 05 + q4,8+1 mod 232
26,8+1 = 26,8 + 06 + q5,8+1 mod 232
27,8+1 = 27,8 + 07 + q6,8+1 mod 232.
A visualization of the how state variables and counters feed into one another is illustrated
in Figure 2.2 from [13].
Figure 2.2. Rabbit State Variables and Counter Relationships. Source: [13].
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2.4.2 Initialization
Per [13], there are twomajor phases to this cipher’s initialization. Here we use ’+’ to indicate
concatenation of two bit strings.
1. The key is subdivided into eight subkeys ( = :7 | |:6 | | . . . | |:1 | |:0, where each subkey is
sixteen bits), and then used to generate the state (G) and counter (2) variables as follows:
G 9 ,0 =

: 9+1 mod 8 + : 9 for 9 even
: 9+5 mod 8 + : 9+4 mod 8 for 9 odd
2 9 ,0 =

: 9+4 mod 8 + : 9+5 mod 8 for 9 even
: 9 + : 9+1 mod 8 for 9 odd.
We then iterate the system four times, and modify each of the counter variables as below to
prevent key recovery via system inversion:
2 9 ,4 = 2 9 ,4 ⊕ G 9+4 mod 8,4.
2. If an IV is used, each of the counter variables are modified according to the below
updates. We use the following notation below to indicate how the IV is sliced: + =
+3 | |+2 | |+1 | |+0,
20,4 = 20,4 ⊕ (+1 + +0)
21,4 = 21,4 ⊕ (+3 + +1)
22,4 = 22,4 ⊕ (+3 + +2)
23,4 = 23,4 ⊕ (+2 + +0)
24,4 = 24,4 ⊕ (+1 + +0)
25,4 = 25,4 ⊕ (+3 + +1)
26,4 = 26,4 ⊕ (+3 + +2)
27,4 = 27,4 ⊕ (+2 + +0).
We then iterate the system four additional times to complete the initialization. In this case,
32
that means the “time” variable 8 begins at 8.
2.4.3 Encryption
As described in [13], keystream is generated by execution of one next-state function and one
counter update. This generates a 128-bit sequence of keystream B8 from the state variables





































As with most stream ciphers, keystream output B8 (16 bytes at a time) is then simply added
on top of the message to encrypt.
2.5 Salsa
The stream cipher Salsa20 was proposed by Daniel Bernstein in [14]. This encryption
algorithm is basically a hash function used in counter mode to generate a cipher stream,
using a 32- or 16-byte key and 8-byte nonce (or 128/256 bit key and 64-bit nonce). The
algorithm for this cipher operates on “words,” which are integers between 0 and 232 − 1,
often written in hexadecimal.
2.5.1 Functions
Each function introduced in this section uses previous functions to develop the inner work-
ings of the cipher. We reproduce the seven functions from [14] as follows.
1. Quarterround function.We let ~ and I be fourword sequences, such that ~ = (~0, ~1, ~2, ~3)
and I = (I0, I1, I2, I3), and quarterround(~) = I, defined as
I1 = ~1 ⊕ ((~0 + ~3) <<< 7),
I2 = ~2 ⊕ ((I1 + ~0) <<< 9),
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I3 = ~3 ⊕ ((I2 + I1) <<< 13),
I0 = ~0 ⊕ ((I3 + I2) <<< 18).
2. Rowround function. We let ~ and I be 16 word sequences, such that ~ = (~0, ~1, . . . , ~15)
and I = (I0, I1, . . . ., I15), and rowround(~) = I defined as
(I0, I1, I2, I3) = quarterround(~0, ~1, ~2, ~3),
(I5, I6, I7, I4) = quarterround(~5, ~6, ~7, ~4),
(I10, I11, I8, I9) = quarterround(~10, ~11, ~8, ~9),
(I15, I12, I13, I14) = quarterround(~15, ~12, ~13, ~14).
3. Columnround function. This can be conceived as the transpose of the rowround function
above. We let G and ~ be 16 word sequences, such that G = (G0, G1, . . . , G15) and ~ =
(~0, ~1, . . . ., ~15), and columnround(G) = ~ defined as
(~0, ~4, ~8, ~12) = quarterround(G0, G4, G8, G12),
(~5, ~9, ~13, ~1) = quarterround(G5, G9, G13, G1),
(~10, ~14, ~2, ~6) = quarterround(G10, G14, G2, G6),
(~15, ~3, ~7, ~11) = quarterround(G15, G3, G7, G11).
4. Doubleround function. This is a column round followed by a row round. So if G is a 16
word sequence, doubleround(G) = rowround(columnround(G)).
5. Littleendian function. We let 1 be a four byte sequence, 1 = (10, 11, 12, 13), and define
littleendian(1) = 10 + 2811 + 21612 + 22413. The outputs of the littleendian function are
usually written in hexadecimal, hence this function is similar in appearance to concatenating
1’s elements from right-to-left (or “little end-first”) order.
6. Salsa20 hash function. Let G, ~, and I be 64-bye sequences, where Salsa20(G) =
littleendian(G)+doubleround10(G) = I. We note this is a three-stage transition: first G to
littleendian, then 10 iterations of doubleround, then the addition and inverse littleendian
transformation.
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If we split G by byte, annotated G = (G [0] | |G [0] | | . . . | |G [63]), we then let G8 =
littleendian(G [ 9], G [ 9 + 1], G [ 9 + 2], G [ 9 + 3]) where 9 = 8 mod 4 and 9 ∈ 1, 2, . . . 16.
This creates a 16-word sequence of G8 from the littleendian of our original G.
We then let ~ = doubleround10(G).
Finally, to get our I = (I0, I1, . . . , I15), we transform littleendian−1(~8 + G8) for 8 ∈
1, 2, . . . , 16. Input was a 64-byte sequence, and our output is the same.
7. Salsa20 expansion function. This function basically takes a 32-/16-byte sequence and a
16-byte sequence and expands them to a 64-byte sequence by inserting constants and using
the above hash function.
If we let f1, f2, f3, and f4 be four-byte sequences of constants, with : and = 16-byte
sequences, then Salsa20: (=) = Salsa20(f0, :, f1, =, f2, :, f3). We note for a 32-byte : , we
would split : into 16-byte halves and insert each into one of the two :’s input in the hash.
2.5.2 Initialization
This cipher conducts no initialization.
2.5.3 Encryption
Using the same terminology as in [14], we take key : , nonce =, and counter 2 (where the
counter is a unique 8-byte sequence representing 0 to 264 − 1), and use these to generate
64 bytes of output for each iteration of Salsa20: (=, 2). For each additional 64 bytes of
keystream, we increment 2 and repeat, again simply adding the keystream to our message
to encrypt.
2.6 Sosemanuk
The stream cipher Sosemanuk was proposed by a dozen contributors in [15]. Its name is
derived from its extensive use of the stream cipher Snow algorithm (direct predecessor to
this algorithm) and from use of portions of the block cipher Serpent (one of the original
competitors to AES, see [16]), which when combined renders “snow serpent”, and this
expression in Cree (an Eastern Canadian tribe) translates to Sosemanuk. This cipher works
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by taking a 128–256-bit key and 128-bit IV, then using an LFSR, Finite State Machine
(FSM), and a special combination of their outputs to generate keystream.
2.6.1 Functions
There are four major components of Sosemanuk, as defined in [15], which we can divide
roughly into the two categories that contribute to its name, that is the Serpent cipher and
the Snow cipher components. We will provide an overview of the Serpent functions first (as
originally proposed in [16]), and then discuss the Snow components (as discussed in [15]).
1. Serpent1. This is the simplest of the four components of Sosemanuk, called Serpent1
because it only uses part of one round of the Serpent block cipher. It simply uses the third
substitution box ((2) from the original Serpent algorithm on groups of four 32-bit words to
return four different 32-bit words.
2. Serpent24. This function relies on reducing the original 32 rounds of Serpent to only
24 rounds (hence the name), and is only used for initialization. This function takes as its
inputs a 128–256 bit key and returns 12 (twelve) 32-bit words, output at different rounds
from Serpent, to populate the initial state of the LFSR and FSM.
Key Schedule
The key is used to generate a key schedule, which is a collection of keys generated from the
original key, to be used in subsequent rounds of Serpent24, per the following steps.
First, the key is padded to reach 256 bits by adding a “1” followed by sufficient “0”s on the
most-significant-end (right side). The key is then expanded into 33 separate 128-bit subkeys
(of which here we only use the first 25), numbered 0 to 32, by writing each subkey as a
collection of eight 32-bit words |−8, . . . , |−1. We then expand these to intermediate keys
|0, . . . , |131 with the following recurrence:
|8 = (|8−8 ⊕ |8−5 ⊕ ||−3 ⊕ |8−1 ⊕ q ⊕ 8) <<< 11,
where q is the fraction part of the golden ratio, which can be expressed as the constant
0x9e3779b9.
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Rounds keys are now output through the use of S-Boxes operating on collections of four
words, where {:0, :1, :2, :3} = ((|0, |1, |2, |3).
Each key,  9 is returned as:  8 = {:48, :48+1, :41+2, :48+3}.
Serpent24 Cipher Use
The Sosemanuk IV is then fed into the Serpent block cipher as plaintext, and the cipher is
run for 24 rounds using the key schedule as described above. Each round consists of key
addition, S-Box, and a set of linear transformations. For each round 8, we have the input
numbers (8), round S-Box ((8), round key ( 8), and the round output (8+1), performed as
follows:
(-0, -1, -2, -3) = (8 (8 ⊕  8)
-0 = -0 <<< 13
-2 = -2 <<< 3
-1 = -1 ⊕ -0 ⊕ -2
-3 = -3 ⊕ -2 ⊕ (-0 << 3)
-1 = -1 <<< 1
-3 = -3 <<< 7
-0 = -0 ⊕ -1 ⊕ -3
-2 = -2 ⊕ -3 ⊕ (-1 << 7)
-0 = -0 <<< 5
-2 = -2 <<< 22
8+1 = -0, -1, -2, -3.
In the final round (8 = 23), we XOR the 24th key to the last step to produce the final values.
The output of each round is fed into the next, but we save the outputs from the 12th, 18th,
and 24th round to initialize the Sosemanuk internal state. If we denote . 9
8
as output 8 from
round 9 , noting that there are four outputs from each round as described above, we assign
the values to populate the Sosemanuk initial state, using B to denote LFSR register positions
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and R1 or R2 to denote FSM registers:
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'20 = .182 .
3. LFSR. The LFSR for Sosemanuk is the same as used in Snow 2.0, can be seen in Figure
2.3.
Figure 2.3. The Sosemanuk LFSR. Source: [15].
For a full description of how this LFSR was built, we let F2 denote the finite field with 2
elements, and V be a root of the following primitive polynomial on F2 [-]:
&(-) = -8 + -7 + -5 + -3 + 1.
We build the field F28 by taking the quotient of F2 [-] via an ideal generated by a polynomial
&(G), F2 [-]/〈&(-)〉. Noting that &(-) is primitive, if we represent each element in F28
with the basis (1, V, V2, . . . , V7), we know that V is a multiplicative generator of all invertible
elements inF28 . Becausewe can use V to generate these elements,we can define the following
bĳection:










We note in the above, each G8 is either a 0 or a 1, and so addition in F28 represents bit-wise
XOR between the corresponding integers. Multiplication by V can be executed by a left
shift of one bit of the integer representation, then an XOR with a fixed mask if the most
significant bit dropped by the shift is 1.
We then define U to be the root of the following primitive polynomial
%(-) = -4 + V23-3 + V245-2 + V48- + V239
on F28 . The quotient algebraic structure F28 [G]/〈%(-)〉 defines a new field F232 that can be
represented with its basis (1, U, U2, U4). Any element in F232 can be identified with a 32-bit
integer via the following bĳection:









This clearly defines the U and its inverse, U−1 used in the above LFSR. We note that
multiplication of some I ∈ F232 by U represents a left shift by 8 bits of q(I) followed by
a 32-bit mask depending on the most significant byte of q(I), with multiplication by U−1
defined similarly with a right-shift instead of left.
The LFSR is built with the following feedback polynomial:
c(-) = U-10 + U−1-7 + - + 1 ∈ F232 [-] .
Each element B8 in the LFSR operates over elements of F232 , beginning at time C = 0 with the
ten 32-bit values of B8 given as outputs from Serpent24. At each new time step, we calculate
GC+10 = BC+9 ⊕ U−1BC+3 ⊕ UBC ,∀C ≥ 1
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and shift the register. The element shifted out of the BC position is used for encryption as
described in the Encryption Section that follows.
4. FSM. The FSM is a component with 64 bits of memory, corresponding to two 32-bit
registers R1 and R2. At each step, the FSM takes input from the LFSR, updates its registers,
and produces a 32-bit output denoted 5C . We note that < is a hexadecimal expression for
the first ten decimals of c, lsb(G) is the least significant bit of x, and mux(2, G, ~) is equal
to G if 2 = 0, respectively, ~ if 2 = 1. The outputs at time C as functions of inputs from the
previous state are defined as:
'1C = ('2C−1 +mux(lsb('1C−1, BC+1, BC+1 ⊕ BC+8)) mod 232
'2C = (< · '1C−1 mod 232) <<< 7
5C = (BC+9 + '1C mod 232) ⊕ '2C .
2.6.2 Initialization
To initialize the initial Sosemanuk state the key and IV are used as inputs to the Serpent24
function, and the specific outputs described in the previous section are used to populate the
registers.
2.6.3 Encryption
A visual depiction of the process and interactions used to generate keystream are depicted
in Figure 2.4.
At each timestep, as prescribed in [15], the following occur:
• FSM is updated as described above, providing input 5C for the keystream.
• LFSR is updated, providing inputs to the FSM and BC for the keystream.
• Every four steps, four keystream words I are generated as follows:
(IC+3, IC+2, IC+1, IC) = (4A ?4=C1( 5C+3, 5C+2, 5C+1, 5C) ⊕ (BC+3, BC+2, BC+1, BC).
We see here that four 32-bit keystream words are generated at a time, per four clocks of
the entire system, by XORing the outptut of Serpent1’s S-Box results of the FSM with the
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Figure 2.4. Overview of the Sosemanuk Cipher. Source: [15].
LFSR’s dropped values. These are then XORed onto the plaintext to generate ciphertext.
2.7 Grain
M. Hell, T. Johansson, and W. Meier proposed the stream cipher Grain in [17]. This is
the first of the hardware-based ciphers, designed for lightweight secure implementation
in hardware chips. Unlike the software ciphers, the elements of the hardware ciphers are
usually represented in bits or elements of GF(2), as opposed to bytes or 32-bit words in
hexadecimal format. This cipher takes an 80-bit key and 64-bit IV, and works by combining
select outputs from a Nonlinear Feedback Shift Register (NFSR) and an LFSR through a
Boolean function to produce keystream.
2.7.1 Functions
There are three functions in the Grain cipher and defined in [17].
1. LFSR. The LFSR state is 80 bits, and operates on a feedback polynomial operating simply
F2, using the feedback polynomial 5 (B) outlined below:
5 (G) = 1 + G18 + G29 + G42 + G57 + G67 + G80.
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This polynomial results in an update function for the LFSR as follows:
B8+8 = B8+62 + B8+51 + B8+38 + B8+23 + B8+13 + B8 .
2. NFSR. The NFSR state is also 80 bits, again operating over F2, with feedback polynomial
(G) defined below:
(G) = 1 + G18 + G20 + G28 + G35 + G43 + G47 + G52 + G59 + G66 + G71 + G80+
+ G17G20 + G43G47 + G65G71 + G20G28G35 + G47G52G59 + G17G35G52G71+
+ G20G28G43G47 + G17G20G59G65 + G17G20G28G35G43 + G47G52G59G65G71+
+ G28G35G43G47G52G59.
This polynomial generates an update function for the NFSR as follows:
18+80 = B8 + 18+62 + 18+60 + 18+52 + 18+45 + 18+37 + 18+33 + 18+28 + 18+21+
+ 18+14 + 18+9 + 18 + 18+6318+60 + 18+3718+33 + 18+1518+9+
+ 18+6018+5218+45 + 18+3318+2818+21 + 18+6318+4518+2818+9+
+ 18+6018+5218+3718+33 + 18+6318+6018+2118+15+
+ 18+6318+6018+5218+4518+37 + 18+3318+2818+2118+1518+9+
+ 18+5218+4518+3718+3318+2818+21.
3. Boolean Functions. These Boolean functions combine inputs from several locations in
the NFSR and LFSR to produce a value of either 1 or 0. We define G = (G0, G1, G2, G3, G4),
and our Boolean function ℎ(G) as
ℎ(G) = G1 + G4 + G0G3 + G2G3 + G3G4 + G0G1G2 + G0G2G3 + G0G2G4 + G1G2G4 + G2G3G4.
This function is then combined with additional elements from the NFSR, where  =




18+: + ℎ(B8+3, B8+25, B8+46, B8+64, 18+63).
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2.7.2 Initialization
As described in [17], the 80 bits of the NFSR are loaded with the 80 bits of the key,
18 = :8, 0 ≤ 8 ≤ 79. The first 64 bits of the LFSR are loaded with the IV, with all remaining
bits set to 1 to ensure the LFSR cannot be initialized to the all-zero state.
The LFSR is then clocked 160 times, with the output from the Boolean XOR’s back into
the inputs for the LFSR and NFSR as illustrated in Figure 2.5.
Figure 2.5. Grain Cipher in Initialization Mode. Source: [17].
2.7.3 Encryption
Per [17], once initialized the cipher generates keystream by clocking the system and using
the Boolean function as described previously, where each clock of the system provides one
bit of keystream. See Figure 2.6 for the system when generating keystream.
2.8 Mickey
The stream cipher, Mickey (which stands for Mutual Irregular Clocking KEYstream gen-
erator), was proposed by S. Babbage and M. Dodd in [18]. This cipher takes an 80-bit key
and an IV of up to 80 bits, and uses two 100-bit registers, labeled R and S, that behave
differently depending on a variable calculated each clocking cycle.
43
Figure 2.6. The Grain Cipher. Source: [17]
2.8.1 Functions
There are three functions in this cipher, each of which can operate differently in different
modes. We paraphrase them from [18] to present in a consistent format here.
1. Linear register clock, operating on register R. This function takes as its inputs register R
(where ' = (A0, A1, . . . , A99)), an input bit for R (A), and a control bit for R (A), and
produces and updated register R’ (where '′ = (A′0, A
′
1, . . . , A
′
99)). There are also taps placed
on half of the positions in the register R, organized in a set called “RTaps”. One linear clock
consists of the following operations conducted on all 8 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 99}:
1 = A99 ⊕ A
A′8 =

0 for 8 = 0
A8−1 ⊕ A if 8 ∈ RTaps
A8−1 else
if A = 1, then A′8 = A
′
8 (from above) ⊕ A8 .
2. Nonlinear register clock, operating on register S. This function takes as its input register
S (where ( = (B0, B1, . . . , B99)), an input bit for S (B), a control bit for S (B), and
produces an updated register S’ (where (′ = (B′0, B
′
1, . . . , B
′
99)). We will use B̂ to denote an
intermediate value. This function also defines a four-row, 100-column lookup table, where
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the 8th column is accessed via a function for each row (08, 18, 08, 18),
B = B99 ⊕ B,
B̂8 =

0 for 8 = 0
B98 for 8 = 99
B8−1 ⊕ (B8 ⊕ $8) · (B8+1 ⊕ 18) else,
B′8 =

B̂8 ⊕ (08 · B) if B = 0
B̂8 ⊕ (18 · B) if B = 1.
3. System Clock. This function takes as inputs registers R, S, a “mixing” Boolean value (<
= true or false), and an input bit (2), and includes executing one iteration of each of the
above two functions,
A = B34 ⊕ A67,
B = B67 ⊕ A33,
A =

2 ⊕ B50 if < = true
2 if < = false
,
B = 2,
Run Linear Register Clock(', A , A),
Run Nonlinear Register Clock((, B, B).
2.8.2 Initialization
As described in [18], we initialize the values of all registers as 0. We then execute the system
clock with the inputs for every bit in the IV, Key, and then additional pre-clock iterations,
as follows:
1. For every bit 8 ∈IV, we run the System Clock with inputs (', (, < = true, 2 = +8).
2. For every bit 9 ∈Key, we run the System Clock function, inputting (', (, < =
true, 2 =  9 ).
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3. Run the System clock 100 times, with (', (, < = true, 2 = 0) as inputs.
This completes the initialization of the registers for the Mickey cipher.
2.8.3 Encryption
Per [18], for a desired keystream of length !, we generate keystream I by XOR’ing the
inputs from the registers as shown below:
I8 = A0 ⊕ B0,
System Clock(', (, < = false, 2 = 0).
The keystream is then added bit-wise to the plaintext to encrypt.
2.9 Trivium
This stream cipher was proposed by C. De Canniere and B. Preneel in [19]. This simple
cipher uses a key of 80 bits, an IV of 80 bits, and a few simple taps along the 288-bit register
to generate keystream.
2.9.1 Functions
This cipher has only one function defined in [19], which is synonymous with one discrete
timestep for the system. We note that B8 denotes the current value of register 8, and that all
operations are defined on GF(2). It is defined as follows:
C1 = B66 + B93,
C2 = B162 + B177,
C3 = B243 + B299,
I8 = C1 + C2 + C3,
C1 = C1 + B91 · B92 + B171,
C2 = C2 + B175 · B176 + B264,
C3 = C3 + B286 · B287 + B69.
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To progress the rest of the register, we shift the values as follows:
(B1, B2, . . . , B93) = (C3, B1, . . . , B92),
(B94, B95, . . . , B177) = (C1, B94, . . . , B176),
(B178, B179, . . . , B288) = (C2, B178, . . . , B287).
2.9.2 Initialization
To initialize the system, per [19], the Key and IV are loaded into the register positions, with
the remaining values padded as 0 or 1, per the below assignments:
(B1, B2, . . . , B93) = ( 1, . . . ,  80, 0, . . . , 0),
(B94, B95, . . . , B177) = (+1, . . . , +80, 0, . . . , 0),
(B178, B179, . . . , B288) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 1, 1).
The system is then clocked 1152 = 4 · 88 times to ensure progression through four full
cycles, but with the keystream bits fed back into the system as follows:
C1 = B66B91 · B92 + B93 + B171,
C2 = B162 + B175 · B176 + B177 + B264,
C3 = B243 + B286 · B287 + B288 + B69,
(B1, B2, . . . , B93) = (C3, B1, . . . , B92),
(B94, B95, . . . , B177) = (C1, B94, . . . , B176),
(B178, B179, . . . , B288) = (C2, B178, . . . , B287).
2.9.3 Encryption
For a visual representation of the system, see Figure 2.7. Once the initialization is complete,
to generate each bit of keystream one simply clocks the system, with the keystream bit 8
output as discussed above,
I8 = C1 + C2 + C3.
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Encryption is achieved by bit-wise addition of the keystream with the plaintext.
Figure 2.7. The Trivium Cipher. Source: [19].
This completes our brief explanation of each of the ciphers this thesis considers. Now
that we have established the process each cipher uses to encrypt or produce keystream, we





The aim of this chapter is to identify and outline the processes this thesis will use to analyze
and compare the ciphers discussed in Chapter 2. This chapter is separate from the analysis
in subsequent chapters to explain the process independent of the ciphers considered. This
could facilitate flexibility in considering additional ciphers for future work, if desired. We
will discuss a broad overview of the ciphers first, then compare operations counts, and
conclude with direct comparisons.
This thesis focuses on mathematical operations and their effects, not a specific program or
implementation of a cipher. This is because in an implementation of a specific cipher there
may bemore efficient techniques that may not execute the same exact sequence of operations
in the cipher’s algorithm. This may be done for a variety of reasons, but one common reason
is to improve efficiency. As an example, very few software implementations of an LFSR
will actually “shift” the values from one box to another, but will instead use a designated
cache of memory for calculations and only recall as required. This greatly reduces the
number of operations the machine has to conduct and is distinct from the way a physical
hardware implementation of the LFSR functions. Rather than a line-by-line discussion
of implementation code, or of the nuanced discussion of computer memory allocation as
compared to hardware function, we focus our analysis on the algorithms directly because
we are interested in analyzing the effects of the operations.
3.1 Broad Comparison
The first section of our analysis is a broad comparison of general characteristics between
the ciphers discussed in Chapter 2. We will provide an outline and discussion comparing
the general architecture, inputs, and outputs to give initial comparisons. We then note some
structural similarities or trends between different ciphers, looking at general sequences or
trends in types of operations. This provides an initial glimpse into general techniques used
in each cipher and gives context for subsequent analysis.
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3.2 Operation Counts
The second section of analysis compares mathematical operations counts across the ciphers.
We provide a total count for each cipher and then examine the frequency of different
operations, with some notes on the code used to generate the data in Appendix A.6. The
aim of this section is to consider the frequency and composition of the various ciphers’
operations, comparing the ciphers and identifying trends.
To allow for a clear comparison of operations across the ciphers, we make the following
general simplification for the operations executed, in line with the types of operations
discussed in Section 1.7. The following are the short-hand values used in our analysis:
1. Addition or XOR;
2. Lookup or S-Box;
3. Multiplication or AND;
4. Rotate or shift;
5. Other: permutation, string slicing, or concatenation.
In order to compile a list for each cipher, each algorithm must be evaluated in accordance
with a standard order of operations. In this thesis we operated in a manner similar to
how many computer programs would interpret the information, working from inside the
parentheses out and then left to right. Specifically, we evaluate all function calls (i.e., an
S-Box lookup), then parenthetical statements, then proceed with the standard ordering of
operations (with rotations given equal ordering with multiplication). We do not consider
reduction by a modulus as an operation per se. This is because in most cases we operate in
a finite field (e.g., bytewise operations), and thus from an algebraic standpoint we are not
conducting an “operation” at all.
As a rudimentary example, we consider the basic “quarterround” function from Salsa20, as
discussed in Section 2.5. In each line of this function, we evaluate the addition first, then the
rotation, then the XOR. Using our above simplification creates the sequence: 1,4,1. Thus the
one iteration of the function performs the sequence (1,4,1) four distinct times, conducting
12 operations total. A function which calls a quarterround (i.e. the rowround) is simply
treated as executing those precise operations each time the function is called.
To facilitate comparisons between ciphers, we iterate each algorithm based on the keystream
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size. The largest cipher output of 64 bytes per algorithm iteration is from Salsa20, so all
other algorithms were repeated to produce this size keystream. As an example, a hardware
cipher that generates keystream one bit per cycle will have to clock eight times to generate
one byte, then clock 64 · 8 = 512 additional times to generate the keystream of one iteration
of Salsa20. The output of this process is a list of operations for each cipher, which specifies
the list of operations executed to generate a common length of keystream. We then use the
Python programming language to analyze these lists.
We again note that in building these lists we are using the algorithms from the ciphers
described in Chapter 2, not the C or any other programming language implementation. We
point this out again because of the significant impacts relevant to this section. Some of the
reasons we make this distinction are:
• These counts do not necessarily indicate the processing requirements of a cipher. One
example of this apparent discrepancy is the difference between adding two six-digit
numbers via software and the hardware implementation of a bitwise AND operation.
These are mathematically and conceptually related operations, but do not have the
same computational requirements or complexity.
• In order to compare the ciphers, as mentioned previously, we repeat the algorithm
for the cipher to generate 64 bytes of keystream. While this allows us to compare the
frequency of operations for a comparable amount of encryption, it also means that
the hardware ciphers (Grain, Mickey, and Trivium) will have disproportionately large
operations counts.
• These counts do not account for the efficiencies gained in a programming language’s
specific implementation of an algorithm. An example of this would be managing a
collection of counters as a vector and incrementing the counters via a single addition
operation on that vector. Efficient management of memory and computer-level oper-
ations are not the same across different implementations, so this thesis resides at the
algorithmic level.
• Differences between a hardware/software implementation are not trivial in computa-
tion or efficiency. But if the implementation is faithful, the effects are still retained.
The example mentioned previously was the implementation of an LFSR. This the-
sis considers one LFSR “clock” to be additions (from each tap) with a final shift,
which describe the mathematical operations conducted but not precisely how a com-
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puter would efficiently manage the memory. Some of the ciphers explicitly discuss
computational efficiency in greater detail, such as [14].
3.3 Specific Comparison
In this third component of our analysis, we draw specific comparisons in different parts of
the algorithms to discuss structural concrete similarities between ciphers that may not be
apparent at the broad level discussed in previously in Section 3.2. We conduct the specific
comparisons by analyzing recurring sequences of operations, and use the term “=-gram” to
describe a specific sequence of operations of length =.
Using the operations sequences obtained from the process in Section 3.2, we wrote a Python
script to count and store these sequences. We analyze the most common =-grams across
the ciphers to assess trends, as well as how those trends relate back to the fundamentals of
encryption discussed in Section 1.3.





This chapter provides a comparison of the ciphers discussed in Chapter 2 via the framework
discussed in Chapter 3. We progress from a broad comparison of the ciphers to compare
operations counts, concluding with comparisons of operations sequences.
4.1 Broad Comparison
Table 4.1 provides an overview of our ciphers. The remainder of this section will discuss
the table, then three key structural similarities between the ciphers.
Cipher Handle Input Output
HC128 Changing S-Box 128-bit key,128-bit IV 1 byte (8 bits)
Rabbit Internal Variables 128-bit key,64-bit IV 16 bytes (128 bits)
Salsa20 Based on Salsa Hash 128- or 256-bitkey, 64-bit IV 64 bytes (512 bits)
Sosemanuk LFSR and FSM 128–256-bitkey, 128-bit IV 16 bytes (128 bits)
Grain LFSR and NFSR 80-bit key, 80-bit IV 1 bit





Trivium Three taps on threeregisters
80-bit key, 80-
bit IV 1 bit
DES Previous Standard(Feistel cipher) 64 (56) bit key 8 bytes (128 bits)
AES Current Standard, 10rounds (SPN cipher)
128–256-bit
key 16 bytes (256 bits)
Table 4.1. Broad Cipher Comparison.
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4.1.1 Broad Notes
The “handle” provided in Table 4.1 is a short description we provide to give a broad contrast
in techniques between the ciphers. It is not intended to be rigorous or complete, but rather
to highlight differences.
We note that the driving force in the similarities of the key length was likely the ECRYPT
competition requirements oriented at a level of security commensurate with a 128-bit key.
The differences in initialization values required is also notable, as we see the range of inputs
from no IV, to optional, to mandatory IV, depending on how the cipher generates its initial
internal state.
The output length discrepancy is highlighted succinctly in Table 4.1, with outputs ranging
from 1 to 512 bits. This is due to the nature of these minimal hardware ciphers, but means
that the operations counts in the next section will have to multiply the hardware ciphers’
algorithm operations list by 512 when comparing the operations sequences and common
=-grams.
Due to the very different encryption techniques used in DES and AES, it is also worth
highlighting that the way in which the key is used is markedly different between these block
ciphers and the stream ciphers in this thesis. Specifically, block ciphers (when functioning
via ECB) use information from the key and interact iteratively with the plaintext in order
to generate the ciphertext. So when we count operations in the next section for these block
ciphers in ECB, we are counting interactions between the key, constants, and the plaintext.
In comparison, the stream ciphers only use their key and IV (if required) to create a kind of
PRNG that is added on top of the plaintext. Thus, when we count operations with stream
ciphers, we are discussing the ways the basic key/IV information is modified in order to
generate an apparently random keystream.
4.1.2 Structural Similarities
This section discusses two major structural trends across all stream ciphers considered, and
then a similarity between each of the block ciphers and a one additional stream cipher.
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Broad Commonality: ARO
Consistent across all of the stream ciphers in this thesis is a very general pattern: two or
three additions, alternating with one to three rotations, then obscured in some way prior to
producing keystream. We will refer to this as the Add Rotate Obscure (ARO) framework.
This framework provides a common cryptographic structure present in every single stream
cipher considered. We will consider each element in turn:
• Two or three additions. This is usually in the form of adding in part of a key, incre-
menting state variables, or combining information in other registers to produce a new
value.
• One to three rotations. This is often interspersed with additions to help both confuse
and diffuse the effects of the key or counter added into the value, and includes a
possible register shift.
• Obscuration. The idea behind this step is that the cipher does not want a cryptanalyst
to be able to “see” the entirety of what is being done, and so “mixes up” the output
considerably. This could consist of slicing and permuting the data in different ways,
using S-Boxes to limit the direct ability to observe the mechanics of keystream
generation, or combining the output from multiple systems, so that the cipher is more
difficult to analyze.
Table 4.2 provides examples of the ARO framework from each of the stream ciphers.
This framework can effectively implement the goals of confusion and diffusion, and can
contribute to breaking up linearity if the rotations are incorporated in the right way. In
adding values together, the cipher confuses the information that will become the keystream
(in addition to diffusing previous rounds’ changes), and through rotation it diffuses these
changes while further complicating the relationship between input and output. Thus several
iterations of adding and rotating result in both effective confusion and thorough diffusion.
While not a cryptographic primitive per se, ARO provides an example of a low-level block
or tool that is used through many iterations to achieve encryption. Its repeated use in all of
our stream ciphers highlight that it is a valuable tool to facilitate encryption, demonstrating
a consistent sequence of operations to that end.
As previously mentioned in Section 3.2, the “quarterround” function in Salsa20 (1,4,1 or
add, rotate, XOR) is consistent with this application. This deliberate sequence in the Salsa20
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Cipher Addition Rotation Obscuration
HC128 5 and  functions 5 and  functions Use of S-Boxes






Sosemanuk LFSR LFSR Serpent1 combina-tion with FSM
Grain LFSR LFSR Boolean functionwith NFSR bits
Mickey RTaps in linear reg-isters Linear register shift irregular combiner
Trivium NFSR taps Register shifts 3 taps and nonlinearstructure
Table 4.2. Cipher Structural Comparison.
cipher was explicitly discussed as the building block (Add-Rotate-XOR or ARX) in [14]. In
that work, the author discusses how the repeated use of this framework is efficiently achieved
in computer memory and execution, rather than as a general cryptographic framework.
Use of Registers
As Table 4.2 points out, LFSRs and NFSRs can fulfill the first two steps in ARO.We can see
this visually by examining the diagrams of the hardware ciphers or the conceptual diagram
of the Sosemanuk cipher. The use of registers in this manner is somewhat more obscured
in the other three ciphers (HC128, Rabbit, and Salsa20), but we will demonstrate how each
of the functions listed in Table 4.2 perform a function analogous to a register.
In HC128, the 5 and  function act like a miniature register: they rotate the input value a
few times, then add each of those values together in a finite field. If we refer to Section 2.3,
we can see that while the inputs are obscured by the S-Boxes, those inputs are still acting
like the “initial value” used to populate a register, which these two functions add together
to return a value. In this way, these functions are analogous to a miniature LFSR.
The way the Rabbit cipher relies on its state variable updates is also similar to a miniature
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LFSR. As discussed in Section 2.4, the cipher builds a miniature register state with the 
function, then builds each state variable based on a different set of taps. Again, we see that
reoccurring pattern in operations.
Similarly, Salsa20’s rowround function, as discussed in Section 2.5, functions like a very
primitive two-stage register. This cipher has additional actions prior to keystream generation,
but the basic principle still applies.
Not all of the stream ciphers considered in this thesis have obvious linear or nonlinear
feedback registers defined. But we can see how the ARO framework applies a “register-
like” action in each that contributes to the cryptographic process.
Block Cipher Similarities
In addition to these broad conceptual similarities between the stream ciphers, we now
discuss one structural similarity between each of the block ciphers considered and one of
the stream ciphers.
First, we highlight that the FSM component of the Sosemanuk cipher is somewhat similar
to the Feistel System used in DES. In each round, one half of the register is passed to the
other (Sosemanuk’s FSM makes a single addition per round), whereas the other half of the
register has several operations performed on it. This is the heart of DES, whereas it is only
a component of Sosemanuk, but it is one of the few very clear similar functions between
DES and the stream ciphers. See Figure 4.1 for a visual representation of this similarity.
Figure 4.1. DES-Sosemanuk Structural Similarity.
For the purposes of highlighting procedural similarities, we combined some steps from each
of the ciphers to build the depiction in Figure 4.1. Specifically, the 5 symbol shown is not
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a single function as defined by the respective algorithms, but is written to more generally
indicate that a function is performed with the given inputs. While this is obviously not a
perfect similarity or parallel, the structural comparison is worth noting.
Second, we note that the only two ciphers discussed in this thesis to deliberately organize
information into a matrix to perform operations on columns or rows are AES and Salsa20. In
the case of AES, the plaintext is reshaped into a matrix, and matrix multiplication between
the plaintext and a set of constants facilitates rapid diffusion in every round of encryption.
This is distinct from Salsa20, which organizes the key and IV intermixed with constants (via
its expansion function) in a matrix and then operates on functions of the rows and columns
of that matrix, but has a similar effect of ensuring rapid diffusion.
In both cases, a depiction of the ciphers in matrix format can help one visualize the
encryption process. This organization is not merely illustrative, but provides an organization
to the data that helps describe how the encryption process works. Using a matrix allows
elements to be accessed in columns or rows, broadening the utility of the rotation or
multiplication operations. As such, the concept of organizing the data is not just conceptual,
but is also procedural.
4.2 Operation Counts
In this sectionwe provide the results of the operation count framework laid out in Section 3.2.
For notes on the Python code used to generate the lists upon which the subsequent analysis
is conducted, see Appendix A.6.
4.2.1 Raw Operation Counts
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the operation counts by cipher to encrypt 64 bytes of information.
We note that the G-axis (indicating the counts) is log-scaled. As mentioned in Section 3.2,
these counts are not an indicator of the computational resources required, as the very high
numbers present in the hardware ciphers are due in part to their bit-wise operation.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates that Sosemanuk algorithm has the lowest count of operations
for a comparable keystream generation, followed by Rabbit. If we first consider the two
major functions used in Sosemanuk’s keystream generation (the LFSR and FSM, as seen
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Figure 4.2. Operation Count by Cipher.
in Section 2.6 and Figure 2.4), we see several bytes of output generated at a time. Each of
these functions only conduct a few additions, some multiplication, and a rotation, in order to
generate keystream, relying on the elegant mathematics of these systems to provide reliable,
random-looking keystream.
The Rabbit cipher has the next-fewest operation count, and this seems reasonable as its state
variables or counters conduct simple updates (albeit carefully crafted) to generate keystream
several bytes at a time. Again we see how a careful system of interconnected parts provides
an efficient technique to generate keystream.
One implication of these low-operation-count ciphers is that higher frequencies of operations
(or put another way: doing more with the information) may not correspond to more security;
careful implementation of structure, as seen in these ciphers, can reduce the total number of
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operations. Again, this does not mean that computational complexity bears no correlation
with security, simply that effective does not mean complicated.
We note that these counts are for the generation of 64 bytes of keystream, and that they do
not indicate the quantity of operations required for initialization of the ciphers. Figure 4.3
demonstrates the way the ciphers compare if we include the counts from initialization.
Figure 4.3. Total Operation Count for Keystream Generation.
We note that one cipher, Salsa20, requires no initialization and so has a linear slope in Figure
4.3, whereas inmost cases the slope changes at some point due to initialization operations. In
general, the ranking of ciphers operations counts remains steady independent of keystream
size. The one exception is HC128, which requires a very high count of operations to initialize
(second highest of the nine ciphers considered) but at 1GB of keystream is just below the
median (third lowest of nine ciphers).
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4.2.2 Count by Operation Type
Examination of Figure 4.4 provides more fidelity on how the ciphers use each of the
operations in order to encrypt. We again note the log-scaled axis (this time the vertical
axis). We make four major observations from this additional information.
Figure 4.4. Operation Count By Operation and Cipher.
First, as one might expect, the hardware ciphers generally conduct the most operations in
every category. This is reasonable: these ciphers operate bitwise, and produce keystream
bitwise, so it will take many iterations of the algorithms described to produce a similar size
keystream.
A second observation is how several ciphers used no S-Boxes at all. Rabbit, Salsa, Grain,
and Trivium all used other cryptographic operations, despite the widespread acceptance
and use of the S-Box as a classical tool to stymie linear cryptanalysis. This speaks to the
reality that, while S-Boxes can be very valuable, they are not necessary or universally used
to achieve effective encryption.
Third, we note that HC128, Salsa, and DES use no multiplication (or AND operation).
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The use of multiplication with a modulus can be a computationally challenging barrier to
invert, providing a powerful shield from cryptanalysis. In asymmetric cryptography this is
the central mathematical operation used to facilitate encryption; but these ciphers achieve
their confusion through other means. Thus it is also worth noting that despite its utility,
multiplication or the use of NFSRs is also not required or consistently used for secure
encryption.
Finally,we note the operations conducted by all ciphers: addition and rotation. This coincides
with the general framework observed in Section 4.1.2. All ciphers but AES conduct more
additions than any other operation, which makes sense given this operation’s utility in key
addition, incrementing variables, and combining information. Addition is ubiquitous, and
so it is unsurprising to see it as the most common operation.
More interesting is the consistent use of the rotation operation. With the exception of DES,
every cipher examined uses frequent rotations. Examining Figure 4.4, we see that for most
ciphers, rotation is the second most frequent operation after addition.We note that this holds
even though only one rotation is counted regardless of its size (e.g., Trivium has a 93-bit
NFSR, or AES rotating four bytes in the row of a matrix of data). This provides a strong
indicator on the importance of rotation.
4.3 Specific Comparison
This section discusses specific =-grams of cryptographic primitives and analyzes common-
alities between various ciphers. We first present the most common =-grams for each cipher,
then compare trends in the most common =-grams.
Table 4.3 provides an overview of the most common =-grams. Each row is a different cipher,
with the columns providing the most common 2-, 3-, and 4-gram for that cipher. We note
the * indicates the most common =-gram(s) are = copies of a single operation (usually 1),
so the next most common non-uniform sequence is shown. In some cases in Table 4.3, we
see the depicted =-gram is still a repeated operation; in those situations the most frequent
=-gram count is so far beyond the next =-gram that the original sequence is reported. See
Appendix A.4 for the listing of the most common =-grams output from our Python script.
We note that, while addition-only =-grams are the most common, sequences containing
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Cipher 2-gram 3-gram 4-gram
HC128 1,2* 1,2,2* 1,1,1,2*
Rabbit 1,1 4,1,1* 1,1,1,1
Salsa 1,4* 1,4,1 1,4,1,1
Sosemanuk 1,3* 1,5,5* 1,5,5,5
Grain 3,3* 3,3,3* 3,3,3,3*
Mickey 1,2 3,1,2 1,1,1,1
Trivium 1,3* 1,1,3* 1,1,3,1
DES 2,2 5,1,5* 2,2,2,2
AES 3,3* 3,3,3* 3,3,3,1*
Table 4.3. Most Common =-grams.
addition with one or two additions with other operations are also very common. All of the
stream ciphers but Grain have addition with another operation (e.g., 1,2 or 4,1,1), providing
a partial example of a sequence comparable to the ARO structure discussed in Section
4.1.2. This observation provides additional support of this general structure, but it is not a
direct support. Because the sequences are different across =-grams, we see that the precise
structure across each of the ciphers is different.
4.3.1 2-grams
Figure 4.5 shows a comparison of the five most common =-grams from the ciphers, which
are all 2-grams. Using the entries in the 2-gram column of Table 4.3, we plot the frequency
of each of the 2-grams, indicating the cipher by colour. The quantity of operations to encrypt
a comparable amount of data differs greatly (as discussed in Section 3.2 and seen in Figure
4.2), so we continue to use the log scale to compare the counts.
We note that this confirms the high frequency of the addition operation, and demonstrates
that the specific =-grams used most commonly in different ciphers varies. This indicates
that while there are clear examples of the general structure discussed in Section 4.1.2,
the specific ciphers’ implementations of those structures is not consistent, as expressed in
=-grams or specific sequences of operations. This is roughly what we would expect, given
the distinct characteristics and operations counts of each of the ciphers. We also note that
the specific list compiled per order of operations may cause two similar-looking sequences
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Figure 4.5. 2-gram Comparison.
may not result in the same =-gram.
Further analysis using the most common 3-grams and 4-grams from each of the ciphers
from each of the ciphers provides no additional insight. See Appendix A.5 for these plots.
4.3.2 Most Common =-grams
In order to better assess significant operations, we consider which =-grams occur in the
most ciphers (ideally all ciphers). To do this, we count which sequences appear in a cipher,
then compare the counts to assess sequences that appear most frequently. However, after
examining the frequency of =-grams in every cipher, there were none present in every single
cipher. Specifically, DES and its use of a Feistel system conducts sequences of operations
that did not have common overlap with several of the other ciphers. As a result, we select
the five most frequent, non-addition-only =-grams.
Table 4.4 displays the results of the ten most consistently observed =-grams in each of the
ciphers. Each row is the =-gram, and the count indicates howmany of the ciphers include that
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specific sequence of operations. Significantly, we note this table indicates that no sequence
of operations is common to all ciphers (as there are nine ciphers considered in this thesis).
=-gram Count
(1, 1) 8
(1, 1, 1) 8
(1, 1, 1, 1) 8
(1, 1, 1, 1, 1) 8
(4, 1) 7
(4, 1, 1) 7
(5, 1) 6
(4, 1, 1, 1) 6
(4, 1, 1, 1, 1) 6
(1, 4) 6
Table 4.4. Most Commonly Observed =-grams.
To gain better fidelity, we refine the data from Table A.4 to examine which specific ciphers
use these common sequences of operations. We remove the sequences of all one operation
(retaining only (1,1)), and then remove highly similar operations (e.g., 4,1,1,1 and 4,1,1,1,1
as they are just extensions of 4,1,1) to consider unique and distinct =-grams. Figure 4.6
displays the counts by cipher of the five remaining operations that meet this criteria.
Figure 4.6 displays the counts for the top five most frequently seen =-grams in the ciphers
considered (excluding addition-only sequences of more than two operations). The counts
for each cipher is indicated by the colour of the bar above the specified =-gram. Three
observations are worth noting from this figure.
First, there is no sequence used by all the ciphers. Additionally, the only specific sequence
used by all of the stream ciphers is (1,1). This shows the broad differences between the
specific operations conducted by the ciphers.
Second, despite the previous observation, we note that if we consider the 2-grams (1,4) and
(4,1), all stream ciphers are included. This provides a concrete example of the alternating
addition and rotation operations discussed in the ARO framework. We note that the only
stream cipher that does not have the (1,4) operation is the Grain cipher, due to the order
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Figure 4.6. Most Commonly used =-gram Comparison.
we evaluated the operations. That said, the cipher does execute a sizeable quantity of (4,1).
This discrepancy is due to how we programmed our order of operations.
Finally, we note that besides the (1,1) operation, all of these most common =-grams in
Figure 4.6 are confirmation of the significance of the ARO framework.
In this chapter we demonstrated and discussed the outputs of the analysis framework pre-
sented in Chapter 3. We conducted a broad comparison, discussed structural similarities
across various ciphers, compared operations counts, and investigated how the frequency of
specific operations sequences, or =-grams, appeared between different ciphers. In the next
chapter, Chapter 5, we summarize the major conclusions of the analysis presented here and




This chapter outlines the major observations and conclusions of the analysis in Chapter 4.
In presenting our conclusions, we divide our findings into two general classes: low-level
conclusions about the utility of mathematical operations, and higher-level conclusions or
major observations about cipher structure. We conclude with additional topics for follow-on
research. We note that all conclusions rest on the idea of a concept “correctly implemented,”
because any operation can be poorly implemented and, consequently, it will fail to achieve
the desired result.
5.1 Mathematical Operations
The first four conclusions we highlight are all observations about the utility and necessity of
specific mathematical operations. These can also be considered the “low-level” conclusions,
because they focus one of the most basic component of the ciphers.
Unsurprisingly, our first conclusion is that addition is the most common operation across all
of our ciphers considered. This can be seen in Figure 4.4 and in the annotated entries in Table
4.3 (or in the original output in Tables A.1, A.2, and A.3). This operation is probably the
most rudimentary mathematical one, and can directly contribute to confusion and diffusion
(via key addition and intermediate value addition, respectively).
Second, as discussed in Section 4.2.2 and seen in Figure 4.4, several secure stream ciphers
do not implement S-Boxes in their algorithms. This indicates that S-Boxes are not required
for a secure stream cipher, despite their early adoption (in block ciphers) and powerful
prospects.
Similarly, while multiplication and modular reduction demonstrate remarkable security in
asymmetric encryption, it is not required for an effective symmetric cipher. Examination
of Figure 4.4 reveals there are ways to achieve the same cryptographic effects without this
operation. Again, we have a useful operation, but not a necessary one.
Our final conclusion on operations, and perhaps much more interesting, is that rotation
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appears to be an essential cryptographic operation. Figure 4.4 shows it to be common across
our secure ciphers. We again note that rotation does not directly indicate a secure cipher.
But as discussed in Sections 1.7 and 4.2.2, its ability to impact all of our cryptographic
goals (confusion, diffusion, and nonlinearity) simultaneously hint at the notion that it is a
critical operation for a secure cipher.
5.2 Cipher Structure
The second four conclusions are all observations that pertain to the nature and structure
of ciphers. These observations can be thought of as “high-level” because they are broader,
cipher-level considerations.
Our first structural conclusion is that there is not a clear correlation between quantity
or complexity of operations and effective security. Per Figure 4.3, for one megabyte of
encryption, we see a frequency spanning four orders of magnitude. We see a stronger lack
of trend in the utility of more or less complex initialization processes, spanning five orders
of magnitude of counts. This result is the clearest example of how effective encryption is
not a product of considerable computation, but rather careful construction.
Second, despite some clear structural trends identified in Section 4.1.2, there were no clear
=-grams (aside from sequences of all 1’s) that consistently appeared across all ciphers. Table
4.3 and Figure 4.5 shows there were not clear front-runners in specific, low-level sequences.
This further supports the notion that how operations are used in the larger perspective on
the cipher is more important than which operations or operations sequences are used.
The third structural conclusion is that the implementation of refinedmathematical structures
can result in fewer operations required. As briefly discussed in Sections 1.2.3 and 1.2.3,
careful selection of the LFSR feedback polynomials ensures generation of the entire field
extension. Simply restated, this means the LFSR state spans all possible configurations and
its outputs are as diverse as possible. If one were to count each timestep of an LFSR or
NFSR as a single operation, then the operations counts of several ciphers would drop even
further. This conclusion is affirmed in the general acceptance of these kinds of structures in
both the hardware and software ciphers considered.
The final conclusion we highlight is the broad conceptual similarity, the ARO, present in
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all of the stream ciphers we consider. As shown in Table 4.2, each of our ciphers displays
the 2-3 addition, 1-3 rotation, and obscuration paradigm. This common implementation,
despite taking very different forms in different ciphers, indicates its utility as a cryptographic
primitive.
5.3 Further Topics for Research
As pointed out in Section 1.1, cryptography is a necessarily open-ended field. Based on the
results discussed previously, we recommend the following as starting points for additional
research.
1. Consider additional ciphers. We recommend ones from more diverse cryptographic
backgrounds (e.g., from non-EU or American sources). Examination of additional
ciphers may further reinforce or refute the conclusions in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. One
examples of a way to extend this would be to consider the block ciphers International
Data Encryption Algorithm (IDEA) and GOST (Magma), and include stream ciphers
RC4 and A5/1 or A5/2, as these ciphers are fairly well-known and produced from
different perspectives.
2. Change the paradigm. Modifying the perspective on the conduct of the order of
operations, or the conceptual framework dictating how the operations are grouped,
would most certainly return different results. This could also include a permuting of
operations conducted at the same or almost the same step. Any of these steps could
likely return very different results.
3. Examine modifications. Selective removal of small slices of the ciphers could reveal
weaknesses and indicate the importance of certain operations or sequences of opera-
tions to security. This could involve extensive work to return results, but would likely
indicate the utility of certain operations or =-grams more conclusively.
4. Conduct successful cryptanalysis.Many ciphers are proven insecure only after lengthy
study, and perhaps the ones considered in this thesis will be no different. A further
analysis and extrapolation of the attacks against simpler versions of these ciphers,
including modified ciphers as mentioned in the previous topic, may reveal which
operations or sequences are essential to security and which are not helpful.
This chapter presented the major conclusions of this thesis. We discussed the efficacy
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of different mathematical operations and contrasted the essential and the apparently non-
essential, then discussed how structure contributes to successful encryption, and offered our
ideas for additional work to build on our findings.
As discussed in Section 1.1, there are many ways and reasons that people choose to encrypt
information. Our hope is that these findings and future projects contribute to a larger
discussion of what operations and sequences are most important to successful encryption.
We hope our findings contribute to ensuring information security and helping to guarantee
privacy in an increasingly information- and technology-driven society.
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APPENDIX: Supporting Work and Additional Data
A.1 Polynomial Long Division
The principle of polynomial long division is demonstrated in many places, including many
standard calculus textbooks and [5].We remember that when calculating the below examples
from F4 = Z2 [G]/〈?(G)〉 (where ?(G) = G2+G+1) we are only concerned with the remainder
term at the bottom. To demonstrate the technique used to solve the polynomial division from
Section 1.2.3, we demonstrate the first two problems where polynomial division is required.
A.1.1 Example (operations over Z2): G2 divided by ?(G)
Using traditional polynomial division, we have:
1
G2 + G + 1
)
G2
− G2 − G − 1
− G − 1
the remainder term above, because the coefficients are from Z2, simplifies to G + 1.
A.1.2 Example (operations over Z2): G3 divided by ?(G)
Again traditional polynomial division returns the following:
G − 1
G2 + G + 1
)
G3
− G3 − G2 − G
− G2 − G
G2 + G + 1
1
the remainder term here is simply 1 as we saw in Section 1.2.3.
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A.2 Group Table Work
We remember that we are discussing elements from F4 = Z2 [G]/〈?(G)〉 in terms of a root
U of the irreducible polynomial ?(G) = G2 + G + 1. In order to reproduce the terms in Table
1.5, we must also keep in mind that the coefficients must be in Z2.
In Table 1.6, we must multiply the terms out and see how they simplify.
- For the 0 and 1 columns and rows, the answers are apparent.
- For U · U, we can take advantage of how we defined U and ?(G) and our knowledge
about Z2:
U2 + U + 1 = 0
U2 = −U − 1
U2 = U + 1.
- For the (1+U) · (1+U) result, we use the above simplification to assist in the second step:
(1 + U) · (1 + U) = 1 + U + U + U2
= 1 + U2
= 1 + U + 1
= U.
A.3 Algorithm Operation Lists
This section includes the lists of a single iteration of the encryption component of each
of the ciphers discussed in Chapter 2. We note that these lists do not indicate how many
iterations of the algorithmmust be run in order to generate a comparable length of keystream
or encryption. See Appendix A.6 for notes on the Python script that helped generate the
data. .
1. DES: 5, 5, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2,
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5,
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1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2,
2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1,
5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2,
2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5, 1, 5, 2, 2,
2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 5, 1, 5.
2. AES: Too long to display; see Python code notes in Appendix A.6.
3. HC128: 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 5, 1, 1.
4. Rabbit: 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1,
1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 4, 4, 4, 1, 1, 4, 1, 1, 4, 4, 1, 1, 4, 1, 1, 4, 4, 1,
1, 4, 1, 1, 4, 4, 1, 1, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 5, 5, 1, 1, 5, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
1, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.
5. Salsa20: Too long to display; see note in Appendix A.6.
6. Sosemanuk: 1, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 3, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 1, 4, 1, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 3, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 1,
4, 1, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 3, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 1, 4, 1, 5, 5, 5, 5, 1, 3, 4, 1, 1, 3, 3, 1, 1, 4, 2, 2, 2,
2, 1, 1, 1, 1.
7. Grain: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3,
3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 4, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3,
3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1.
8. Mickey: Too long to display; see note in Appendix A.6.
9. Trivium: 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 3, 1, 1, 4, 4, 4.
A.4 Most Common =-grams
This section includes the returns when examining the highest 5 counts and their =-grams for
a sequence of at least < operations long. In other words, we only see the 5 most common
m-or-higher =-grams to return these values. We note the parentheses are because we are
examining tuples (the Python data type).
We note there are some sequences of operations that appear on multiple tables; this is
because in some ciphers there were sequences of operations that occurred very frequently
even when considering only a minimum of < = 2. We also note that as we increase <, we
see a decrease in the count of the most common =-grams. This follows our intuition.
Some entries in Table A.3 had to be abbreviated to properly display all of the information.
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Cipher 1 2 3 4 5
HC128 (1, 1) (2, 2) (1, 1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 2, 2)
Rabbit (1, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Salsa20 (1, 1) (1, 4) (4, 1) (1, 4, 1) (4, 1, 1)
Sosemanuk (5, 5) (1, 1) (1, 3) (5, 5, 5) (4, 1)
Grain (1, 1) (3, 3) (1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1)
Mickey (1, 2) (3, 1) (3, 1, 2) (2, 1) (1, 2, 1)
Trivium (1, 1) (1, 3) (3, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 3)
DES (2, 2) (2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
AES (1, 1) (3, 3) (1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1)
Table A.1. Most Common Results: < = 2
Cipher 1 2 3 4 5
HC128 (1, 1, 1) (1, 2, 2) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 2) (2, 2, 2)
Rabbit (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (4, 1, 1)
Salsa20 (1, 4, 1) (4, 1, 1) (1, 4, 1, 1) (1, 1, 4) (4, 1, 1, 4)
Sosemanuk (5, 5, 5) (1, 5, 5) (5, 5, 1) (5, 1, 3) (1, 3, 4)
Grain (1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Mickey (3, 1, 2) (1, 2, 1) (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Trivium (1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 3) (1, 3, 1) (3, 1, 1) (1, 1, 3, 1)
DES (2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (5, 1, 5)
AES (1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Table A.2. Most Common Results: < = 3
We note that these longer sequences of the same operation are the reason for the very
high frequency of shorter sequences of that same operation. As an example of this, in the
sequence “(1, 1, 1, 1)” we have the =-gram “(1, 1)” three times.
A.5 Most Common 3- and 4-gram Plots
In this section we present the plots of the most common 3- and 4-grams from Table 4.4. We
again note that the reason this is presented here is because it does not provide substantial
new insight beyond what is already discussed in Section 4.3.2.
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Cipher 1 2 3 4 5
HC128 (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 2) (1, 1, 2, 2) (1, 1, 1, 2, 2) (1, 1, 1, 1, 2)
Rabbit (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (seven 1’s) (eight 1’s)
Salsa20 (1, 4, 1, 1) (4, 1, 1, 4) (1, 1, 4, 1) (1, 4, 1, 1, 4) (4, 1, 1, 4, 1)
Sosemanuk (1, 5, 5, 5) (5, 5, 5, 5) (5, 5, 5, 1) (5, 5, 1, 3) (5, 1, 3, 4)
Grain (1, 1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3, 3, 3) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1)
Mickey (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (seven 1’s) (eight 1’s)
Trivium (1, 1, 3, 1) (1, 3, 1, 1) (1, 1, 3, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1) (3, 1, 1, 3)
DES (2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2) (seven 2’s) (5, 1, 5, 2)
AES (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (3, 3, 3, 3) (3, 3, 3, 1)
Table A.3. Most Common Results: < = 4
Figure A.1. 3-gram Comparison.
Figure A.1 illustrates the frequency of the most common 3-grams in each cipher. With the
exception of the (1,1,1) 3-gram, there are not universally-used sequences to highlight.
Figure A.2 illustrates the frequency of the most common 4-grams in each cipher. Again,
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With the exception of the (1,1,1,1) 4-gram, there are no major trends or specific sequences
worth highlighting.
Figure A.2. 4-gram Comparison.
A.6 Python Code
Source code is available upon request.
For each of the examples in Chapter 1, including Tables 1.7, 1.8, and 1.9, we used the same
key “0123456789012345” and a suitable nonce as required. We note that these examples
require the use of the Cryptodome package.
To generate the tables in Chapter 4, some of the code will have to be modified to examine
different aspects of the counts.
76
List of References
[1] Announcing the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), NIST FIPS-197, 2001. [On-
line]. Available: https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/fips/197/final
[2] K. H. Rosen, Discrete Mathematics and its Applications, 7th ed. New York, NY:
McGraw-Hill, 2012.
[3] S. Roman, Introduction to Coding and Information Theory. New York, NY:
Springer, 1992.
[4] W. Trappe and L. Washington, Introduction to Cryptography with Coding Theory,
2nd ed. New York, NY, USA: Pearson, 2005.
[5] J. B. Fraleigh, A First Course in Abstract Algebra, 7th ed. Addison Wesley, 2003.
[6] C. E. Shannon, “Communication theory of secrecy systems,” The Bell System Tech-
nical Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pp. 656–715, 1949.
[7] H. M. Heys, “A tutorial on linear and differential cryptanalysis,” Cryptologia,
vol. 26, no. 3, pp. 189–221, 2002.
[8] M. Matsui, “Linear cryptanalysis method for DES cipher,” inWorkshop on the The-
ory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer, 1993, pp. 386–397.
[9] T. W. Cusick and P. Stănică, Cryptographic Boolean Functions and Applications.
Academic Press, 2017.
[10] NIST-FIPS, “Data Encryption Standard (DES),” Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication, pp. 46–3, 1999.
[11] J. Daemen, “Cipher and hash function design strategies based on linear and differen-
tial cryptanalysis,” Ph.D. dissertation, Computer Security and Industrial Cryptogra-
phy (COSIC), KU Leuven, Leuven, Belgium, 1995.
[12] H. Wu, “The stream cipher HC-128,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM II Proceedings, 2008.
[Online]. Available: https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
[13] M. Boesgaard, M. Vesterager, T. Christensen, and E. Zenner, “The stream cipher
Rabbit,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM II Proceedings, 2008. [Online]. Available: https:
//www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
[14] D. J. Bernstein, “Salsa20 specification,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM II Proceedings,
2008. [Online]. Available: https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
77
[15] C. Berbain, O. Billet, A. Canteaut, N. Courtois, H. Gilbert, L. Goubin, A. Gouget,
L. Granboulan, C. Lauradoux, M. Minier et al., “Sosemanuk, a fast software-
oriented stream cipher,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM II Proceedings, 2008. [Online].
Available: https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
[16] R. Anderson, E. Biham, and L. Knudsen, “Serpent: A proposal for the Advanced
Encryption Standard,” NIST AES Proposal, vol. 174, pp. 1–23, 1998.
[17] M. Hell, T. Johansson, and W. Meier, “Grain: A stream cipher for constrained en-
vironments,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM II Proceedings, 2008. [Online]. Available:
https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
[18] S. Babbage and M. Dodd, “The stream cipher MICKEY 2.0,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM
II Proceedings, 2008. [Online]. Available: https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
[19] C. De Canniere and B. Preneel, “Trivium,” in ECRYPT eSTREAM II Proceedings,
2008. [Online]. Available: https://www.ecrypt.eu.org/stream
78
Initial Distribution List
1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
79
